The Missile Crisis: Writing on the Wall

By Jerry Fresia, Ph.D.

Martin Sherwin’s Gambling with Armageddon, the story of the Cuban Missile Crisis, is nothing short of a powerful, gripping tale. I’ve read a few accounts of those much-discussed thirteen days, but none come close to the palatable sense of drama and suspense that Sherwin delivers.

As readers of this site will likely know, as soon as President Kennedy became aware that Khrushchev had placed offensive missiles in Cuba, he assembled many of his close advisers who would then meet daily with the president to flesh out new developments and possible responses. This group of decision-makers has come to be known as the Executive Committee of the National Security Council or ExCom. Luckily for us, these meetings were secretly recorded and constitute our best way of grasping the reality of the ebb and flow of the individual participants thinking.

In addition, there were also side meetings. These occurred in the Oval Office, the Pentagon, and the State Department. There were also revelations brought to light through memoirs, interviews, anniversary meetings, subsequent articles, and, of course, similar accounts offered by Soviet participants. 

I mention this in order to explain what makes Sherwin’s style so engaging. Sherwin leads the reader through this labyrinth chronologically. Hour by hour, day by day, we watch the unfolding and changing positions, the points of view articulated inside smaller group meetings, but hidden or modified when the actors are re-assembled as a whole. Along the way, there are surprises, new crises, wisdom and insight, maturity, reckless posturing, a heavy dose of misinformation, and a touch or two of plain old madness. 

       Interestingly, Sherwin believes that to understand the Missile Crisis, one needs to understand the Cuban revolution. This is insightful because Sherwin is implicitly drawing a through-line with the liberation or reform efforts of Mosaddeq, Árbenz, and Castro, and Kennedy who, while not administering reform, blocks, repeatedly, the CIA’s effort to effect regime change in Cuba. I shall argue that there is in this episode a power dynamic that is foundational to understanding the assassination of President Kennedy.

Liberation Movement Cuba [1]

By opening the door to an examination of the Cuban revolution,[2] Sherwin is allowing us to view the Missile Crisis as a conflict between two distinct systems of power: one source of power are those forces committed to the preservation of colonial regimes and the other is the forces resisting that preservation in order to effect national liberation. This puts JFK in a bind. Simultaneously, by virtue of his position as president alone, he would be compelled to use his military to elevate corporate interests and squash liberation movements. This, in effect, is his presidential responsibility, his job. And yet we see him feverishly working to block his military from restoring a colonial government on the Cuban island. Let’s follow Sherwin’s lead, then, taking a peek at the Cuban revolution and the reform efforts of Mosaddeq in Iran and Árbenz to which Sherwin also calls our attention.

Under Batista, 70 percent of Cuba’s arable land was owned by foreigners. Castro’s first priority was the redistribution of land through his Agrarian Reform act. Most of the sugar industry was owned by Americans. In addition, Castro’s reforms included education, health care, housing, and road building in rural zones. Some American ranches were nationalized, and the Cuban government ordered foreign refineries to refine Soviet crude oil. American refineries refused, and Castro nationalized them in response. The US government then ended its sugar quota, which gave Castro a good reason to nationalize all American properties. An embargo followed while Castro went on to seize all Mafia casinos, broke up drug and prostitution rings, and effectively ended the Mafia-politician corruption centered in Havanna. 

Liberation Movement: Iran

“Mohammad Mosaddeq, the elected prime minister of Iran, had nationalized the assets of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, a British enterprise that had refused to cooperate with the Iranian government’s demand for access to its books. Agents from M16, Britain’s CIA equivalent, suggested a joint operation to overthrow Mosaddeq, and President Eisenhower endorsed the idea.”[3]

Liberation Movement: Guatemala

“Jacobo Árbenz, the president of Guatemala who….[following] through on his economic and social reform campaign promises… threatened the landholdings of the United Fruit Company…[which had affiliations with both John Foster and Allen Dulles]….President Eisenhower authorized a…“psychological warfare and political action, ” “subversion,” and “assassination,” all cobbled together as Operation PBSUCCESS.” The operation did not run smoothly. CIA-trained fighters were pinned down until CIA planes bombed Guatemala City. Árbenz was able to flee the country.[4]

In each of these movements[5] we find the material interests of the most powerful jeopardized. Or, if we continue examining these events in terms of clashing systems of power, we might say, using economic terms, that the surplus takerswere being overtaken by the people from whom the surplus was being taken, the expropriated. Further, a key element in this dynamic was the progressive leadership by a head of state. From the point of view of American corporate titans newly ascended--following WWII-- to world hegemonic power, each of these national liberation movements would be seen as a five-alarm fire. Note the position of the CIA, which played the key role in suppressing the liberation movements in Iran, Guatemala, and Cuba: liberation movements present “The gravest danger to the US….(my emphasis).” [6] Why the gravest? Because the US believed in and feared “Soviet expansionism,” which in turn was perceived as frustrating the US hegemonic ability to expropriate colonized wealth and resources throughout the world. Note too, Eisenhower’s Secretary of State John Foster Dulles’ fear: “The poor always want to plunder the rich; there is a rising tide all over the world wherethe common man aspires to higher and wider horizons [and where] Russia is able to expand her influence over the earth by associating with these dangerous currents.”[7]

The Eisenhower Factor

“Russia is definitely out to communize the world. We face a battle to extinction between the two systems.” So wrote Dwight D. Eisenhower in his diary in 1946. In 1958, Eisenhower told Greece’s Queen Frederika  that “To accept the Communist doctrine and try to live with it would cost too big a price to be alive.” While we may have been led to believe that Allen Dulles was the rabid anti-Communist ideologue, Sherwin believes that it was actually Eisenhower (my emphasis). Argues Sherwin, Allen Dulles was “the mouthpiece, almost a puppet for Eisenhower (my emphasis).”[8]  

So we find that even before Kennedy became president, he wasn’t trusted, given his views expressed in the Senate chamber on western imperialism. That he arranged to send to every member of the Senate, Burdick and Lederer’s The Ugly American, a book which may have made cold warriors wince.  Not surprisingly, Eisenhower was terribly upset with JFK’s victory in 1960 (his blood pressure “soaring to dangerous levels”). He was convinced that Kennedy had allowed communism to thrive just off the Florida coast and that he would “do almost anything to avoid turning the country over to ‘the young genius.’ ”[9]   It was “the repudiation of everything I’ve done for eight years.”[10]

“It is now clear  from available evidence,” writes Sherwin, “that he would impose on his successor” a way to ensure that he would be saddled with the commitment to “eliminate Castro and his government” from Cuba.[11] This desire, not surprisingly, was consistent with a group of corporate leaders with business interests in Cuba (surplus takers) who had met with CIA Director Allen Dulles. They wanted Dulles to pass a message on to Eisenhower: “Get off of dead center and take some direct action against Castro.”[12] Eisenhower understood his order: At an NSC meeting he “decided that Castro should join Mosaddeq and Árbenz as yet another CIA Cold War trophy.”[13] This “new plan, a full-fledged invasion would be delivered to former Navy lieutenant, JFK, as an action program approved by the 5 star general-president who had organized and commanded the invasion of Normandy.”[14]

The reader may be familiar with the rest of the Bay of Pigs story, but it is necessary to retell it in the context of the missile crisis. 

Due to a recent declassification of thousands of pages from the CIA in 2011 (50th anniversary of the Bay of Pigs Invasion), it is now known that the CIA task force in charge of the paramilitary assault knew the operation could not succeed without becoming an open invasion supported by the U.S. military. According to Peter Kornbluh, this was the most important revelation of the declassification of the official history of the CIA. [15]

Thomas L. Hughes, a former intel specialist, told Sherwin: the entire operation was intended to “entrap” JFK, who repeatedly warned the Bay of Pig planners that under no circumstances would he authorize American combat forces to become involved in the operation.[16] And so he didn’t, and the revolutionary-minded Castro and his government survived, the only one by the way, to survive the relentless onslaught of American military power since 1917. 

But there would be one more chance for the corporate surplus-takers and their banished allies to get their resources and power re-established in Havana. It would be the Missile Crisis.

Thirteen Days

Perhaps the one thing in reading Sherwin’s tale that grabbed my attention was the story of Senator Kenneth Keating from New York. The official story is that on 14 October 1962, photo-intelligence analysts discovered that Khrushchev had placed offensive surface-to-surface nuclear ballistic missiles on the island of Cuba. The information was relayed to President Kennedy on 16 October 1962, and on 29 October, Khrushchev agreed to withdraw his missiles, hence the Cuban Missile Crisis of thirteen days.

But a Republican Senator from New York, Kenneth Keating, had been insisting since 1 September that, indeed, Soviet missiles had been placed on the island, and this was a full month before President Kennedy was presented with evidence. Further, John McCone, CIA Director, also was insisting on the delivery of missiles to Cuba. But playing his cards closely, McCone said he had no source, merely that his pronouncements were a “hunch.”

Keating, who died in 1975, never revealed his source, but after years of pressuring, even by Senator Ted Kennedy, Keating only would say that his mystery source had provided conclusive evidence and that he was an official intelligence source within the DOD. Interesting, too, is that on October 16, when Kennedy assembled his team of advisors to deal with the crisis, “his advisers speculated that an official in the Defense Department served as Keating’s source. They named him, but the person’s name has been deleted from the official transcript of the meeting and remains classified.”[17]

The gravity of the crisis, one would assume, would have required an immediate notification of the president. Further, that a CIA Director would just happen to have a hunch, which just happens to mirror reality precisely, strains credulity.  A more likely explanation is that this was another effort to entrap the President: he had to act since the missiles were already installed and loaded. Further, it shows that the initiation of hostility would have been welcomed by members of the JCS and others: a pretext to eliminate the Castro menace once and for all and, finally, the island could be returned to the corporate surplus takers who had ruled there since 1900. 

The Chomsky Factor

Let us pause for a moment to consider the Noam Chomsky perspective to help understand the power dynamics in this saga.   Chomsky has claimed that if the Nuremberg laws were applied, then every post-war American president would have been hanged for committing atrocities. The reason why is this: the CIA has had the responsibility to crush liberation movements around the globe. The surplus takers must win; investors and wealth accumulators must win. The people on the bottom, the expropriated, must lose. It’s a system of power. This is why Chomsky will say that presidents really don’t make policy. The policies flow from institutions, and presidents just get on board and execute the policy handed to them.

But what happens if a president like Kennedy keeps pushing for peace and doesn’t get on board when his closest advisors push hard to support covert wars that keep colonial systems in place? 

Armageddon Nears

Other than on the very first day when Kennedy said that they might have to take military action and “wipe them out,” Adlai Stevenson, UN Ambassador, countered no. A diplomatic solution is possible. From that point forward, Kennedy never wavered in his belief that a peaceful resolution was the only sensible one. Yet, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and its Chairman and many others were ferociously committed to removing Castro by military force. Kennedy was lucky to have the UN Ambassador in the group who suggested a blockade as a way. This approach was useful in stalling the implementation of the policy favored by the Hawks.

As with the Bay of Pigs fiasco, the contempt for Kennedy was not disguised. Admiral George Anderson Jr., Chief of Naval Operations, felt that the blockade was a “lame response by a president who ducked military intervention in the Bay of Pigs.” Anderson was also furious when Kennedy insisted on having total control over military operation decision-making and that he, the president, was crossing “a bright red line.”[18]

McCone reported Eisenhower’s position, which was “as hawkish as the Chiefs all out military action.” Kennedy didn’t respond, believing that Eisenhower was “out of touch with the world.”[19]

Undersecretary of State George Ball’s position was that the situation was a “test of will” that required that the US respond with decisive military force in order to maintain the confidence of our allies.”[20]

Treasury Secretary Douglas Dillion said that, “A military strike is our only solution. Survival of the free world fabric is at stake.” [21]

General Taylor, Chairman of the JCS, intoned: “All the commanders and the Chiefs want a military assault and then invasion, take it out with one hard crack.”[22]

Chief of Staff of the Air Force General Le May declared: “This blockade and political action, I see leading into war….This is almost as bad as the appeasement at Munich.”[23]

President Kennedy sharing an insight with General Wheeler mused,  “Cuba added to the Soviet arsenal didn’t add particularly to our danger. The real danger is the use of nuclear weapons.”

General Wheeler: “Am I clear that you are addressing yourself as to whether anything at all should be done?”

President Kennedy: “That’s right.” [24]

Aftermath

James Douglas points to the Cuban missile crisis as a turning point in the presidency of John Kennedy. During the last year of his life, he saw a more confident, more imaginative, peace-driven president emerge, pointing to the following bold peace initiatives that flowed from his missile crisis experience: 

1) His audacious peace speech in June of 1963, where he states again his belief, as he did during the ExComm meetings, that while we probably would not change our minds about each other’s economic systems, we could live peacefully together; 

2) He engineered the passage of the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty; 

3) He proposed a way to withdraw from Vietnam with NSA Memorandum 263; and 

4) he had established a covert dialogue with Fidel Castro. And if that were not enough, I would add his proposal to collaborate with the Soviets in placing a man on the moon.[25]

Concluding Thoughts

• The story of the Cuban Missile Crisis is, in important ways, an explanation of JFK’s assassination. Most of his advisors were flat out moving in a warlike position, as he was holding firm. He had established a direct back channel with Khrushchev in 1961, which he used to ask (the “enemy”) for help in blocking his general’s efforts. Afterward, he had also established back-channel talks with Castro in hopes of achieving a US-Cuba détente. 
  
  
• Daniel Ellsberg noted that when the missile crisis was over, there was a “fury” within the Air Force. “There was virtually a coup atmosphere in Pentagon circles. Not that I had the fear there was about to be a coup - I just thought it was a mood of hatred and rage. The atmosphere was poisonous, poisonous.”[26]
  
  
• The JCS, so committed to finding a path toward war, were out-maneuvered and instead were left not just with a peaceful solution, which they despised, but also a commitment by JFK to Khrushchev not to invade Cuba, ever. Further, Kennedy’s successful diplomacy also turned on meeting the second demand by Khrushchev that Kennedy dismantle the Jupiter nuclear missiles in Turkey, placed there by Eisenhower. Kennedy kept this capitulation secret, given the complexity of the negotiation at the time and the risk of the [27]JCS succeeding in pushing their agenda to the fore. Writes Sherwin: “If a diplomatic solution was still possible, he would have to pursue Khrushchev’s offer privately.” [28]
  
  
• Kennedy ended Operation Mongoose at the conclusion of the crisis. The CIA, however, hoping for a slip into overt military action, kept the program going throughout the thirteen days and beyond.
  
  
• The US intelligence was not terribly accurate. Instead of 10,000 Soviet troops in Cuba, there were 40,000. Also, the US was unaware that some of the nuclear weapons were operational and that missile crews were under orders to launch their missiles were the US to attack. Therefore, every single military response put forward by ExComm members apart from the blockage, if carried out, would have likely resulted in a nuclear war.
  
  
• Often, Kennedy is lauded for his diplomatic skills but chided for having created the crisis in the first place. Khrushchev has said that he put the missiles into Cuba for two reasons: 1) to prevent an invasion, and 2) to respond in kind to the missiles put on the border of the Soviet Union in Turkey and also those in Great Britain. We now know that both the attempted invasion and the placement of missiles in Turkey and Great Britain were under the orders of Eisenhower, who arrived in office with 1,200 nuclear missiles in the US arsenal and left with 22,000. [29]
  
  

Who Was Kennedy?

In a campaign speech in October 1960, Senator Kennedy said: “I want to talk with you tonight about the most glaring failure of American foreign policy today - about a disaster that threatens the security of the whole Western Hemisphere - about a Communist menace that has been permitted to arise under our very noses, only 90 miles from our shores.” Yet just two years later, Kennedy said in a speech to the Inter-American Press Association, “A small band of conspirators …[had made] Cuba a victim of foreign imperialism… an instrument of the policy of others, a weapon in an effort dictated by external powers…. Without it, everything is possible.”[30]

 In the first statement, he sounds like one of his own JCS generals. In the second, anti-communism is soft; his understanding of the plight of those suffering under the weight of foreign wealth extraction could have been made by Árbenz or even Castro. Was this the turn that Douglass speaks about? Yes, a change in confidence, perhaps. But I think it always was the private Kennedy, hidden when he chose to run to the right of Nixon during the McCarthy era. His private conversations and his public commitment to peace not only show him not to be an anti-communist ideologue, they show him, as president, to be a threat to the national security interests of the US.  Writes Sherwin, “It is fantastic to watch Kennedy’s mind, how he thinks about things. It’s so different from the rest of his advisors, how those same people, in smaller private meetings just wanting to know when they can start bombing.”[31]

Chomsky states, “The thesis is understood to imply that JFK would not have responded to the changing conditions in the manner of his closest advisers and war mongers. If true, the thesis is important, lending weight to the belief that Kennedy was indeed a remarkable if not unique figure.”[32]

This statement was made in relation to JFK’s Vietnam policy. But I think the sentiment would apply equally to his handling of the missile crisis. 

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Footnotes