Vince Palamara: President Kennedy Should Have Survived Dallas
Vince Palamara has carved out an indelible niche for himself in the literature on the assassination of President Kennedy. No one has done as much work as he has on the Secret Service and their failure to protect President Kennedy in Dallas. And no one has written as many books on that subject. He revealed to me via email that his intent is for his latest tome to be his last. It is entitled President Kennedy Should Have Survived Dallas.
With that title, one can imagine what Palamara thinks about the work of people like Lisa McCubbin, Clint Hill and Gerald Blaine. Right out of the gate, he makes it clear that he thinks their work amounts to a whitewash. (p. 1) But as we shall also see, he has problems with Paul Landis.
I
Since this is his announced swan song, we should note that Palamara started publishing articles on his pet subject back in the nineties. He did so in both The Fourth Decade and Probe Magazine. Because no one had ever done this kind of specialized inquiry, or the interviews he did, the material was immediately arresting. In the nineties, Vince also began to speak at conferences like the late Fourth Decade publisher Jerry Rose’s in Fredonia, New York.
But as he relates in this book, Palamara reached a milestone in his journey on June 1, 2005. On that date, he wrote a 22-page letter--which he sent signed receipt--to Secret Service agent Clint Hill. As most of us know, Hill became famous on November 22, 1963, because he was the only agent who could be seen going into action to provide protection. After the first volley, Hill sprinted from the running board of the following car to the presidential limousine. Jackie Kennedy, his personal assignment, was leaning on the trunk of the car to retrieve a piece of bone from her husband’s skull. Hill ran to her, ushered her back into the car and then attempted to cover both Kennedys with his body. But he was too late--the fatal shot to the skull killed President Kennedy. Both Hill and Jackie Kennedy would be haunted by this moment the rest of their lives.
Which is one reason Palamara wrote the letter, which he includes in this volume. (pp. 103-28) To put it mildly, Hill did not like the letter. Because one of the key points of Vince’s research--and in this book--is to expose the cover story that certain persons in the Secret Service put together after Dallas. In watching the Zapruder film, it is immediately evident that there were no agents on the back bumper of the presidential limousine. Even though that car is built with footholds and hand grips for just that purpose.
What makes this even stranger is this. As the limousine departed Love Field, two agents who were accompanying the car to the rear were called off by their superior, Emory Roberts. (Click here https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=glPyZAj_wqc) In this book, Palamara wonders if agents Don Lawton and Henry Rybka had been designated to ride on the rear of the car. Because it is obvious that Lawton is extremely puzzled and disturbed by Roberts’ order. (p. 124)
This is an important point. Because if there had been agents on the rear of the car, it would have been much more difficult to hit Kennedy from behind. Clearly, someone in the Secret Service understood what a liability problem this posed for them. Because certain people went about trying to disguise this all too visible collapse in protection.
There were five notes from agents collected by Chief James Rowley, who reported them to the Warren Commission. The notes stated that it was President Kennedy who asked not to have agents on the rear of the car. (p. 105) He allegedly said this on his trip to Tampa, right before Dallas. To say that Palamara is suspicious about these notes does not begin to describe his level of skepticism.
For example, he writes that 3 of them are just on plain sheets of paper. Not on Secret Service or Treasury issue. Hill’s is undated, and Hill was not in Tampa. Further, two others –Jerry Behn and Floyd Boring—both denied to the author that Kennedy ever issued any such order. (p. 105) And, in fact, Palamara has eyewitnesses who saw Secret Service agents on the rear of the car in Tampa; one of them being a congressman who was in the car with Kennedy. (p. 53)
These denials by Behn and Boring initiated a fuller inquiry by the author into the subject. And it forms one of the most compelling parts of the book. Palamara lists 15 corroborating witnesses who all say that either they did not recall, or actually deny, that Kennedy said any such thing. (pp. 110-25) Some of them do so in quite forceful terms. For example, Sam Kinney told the author, “That is absolutely, positively false…no, no, no.” (p. 114) Art Godfrey said, “That’s a bunch of baloney, that’s not true. He never ordered us to do anything.” (p. 113)
Which leaves the question: Did Hill either wittingly or unwittingly take part in a CYA machination to get the Secret Service off the hook and blame Kennedy for his own murder?
II
Hill did not want to talk to Palamara after he got his letter. (p. 128) In fact, Hill seems to have tried to disguise his reaction to it. To one person, he tried to deny that they spoke or that he ever got the letter. Which are both not true. (ibid)
In fact, Palamara makes a strong case that Hill talked to Gerald Blaine a few days later about his letter. Agent Blaine was on the Texas trip but not in Dallas. (p. 4) The author then makes the case that it was this letter that provoked Blaine to write the book The Kennedy Detail. (p. 4) As Palamara notes from a newspaper interview Blaine did, it was during this time period that he began to contact many agents who were on the Kennedy detail back in 1963. Why did Blaine do this? According to that report, it was because, “…he began seeing all the misinformation and outright deceit about the assassination on the Internet, as well as in books and films.” So, we are to think that he managed to avoid all this controversy for over 40 years? Including the firestorm that broke out in 1991 over Oliver Stone’s film, JFK?
The Kennedy Detail was co-written by Lisa McCubbin, Hill’s future wife. Clint Hill wrote the foreword. While the book was being finished, Palamara got a letter from Blaine’s attorney to take down a notice on his blog about the upcoming book. (pp. 4-5) The first chapter of the present book is a thorough examination of the McCubbin/Blaine book. To say the least, the author finds it quite problematic. First, unlike what the subtitle says, this was not the first time many of these agents spoke about what happened in Dallas. (p. 6) Several of them spoke to both the Warren Commission and to William Manchester for his best-selling book, The Death of a President. Incidentally, in the Manchester book, he repeated the dubious quote about JFK wanting the agents off the back of the car. This was, by inference, attributed to Boring. But Boring said he never told Manchester any such thing. And when Palamara tried to get Manchester to specifically reveal his source, he would not. The author thinks it might be either Roberts or Blaine. (pp. 12-13)
A curious aspect of the Blaine/McCubbin work is that it contains no footnotes, sources or bibliography. Which is weird considering how long it took to write the book. Secondly, Blaine did not start the book until many people, both high up in the Secret Service and in the lower ranks, had already passed. Just recall, Palamara started his research over 15 years before McCubbin/Blaine published. So people like Behn, Boring and James Rowley—along with many others—were not available for the later book. In addition, several died during the book’s journey to completion. And because of the lack of specific references, it is not easy to figure out who actually was interviewed.
In order to pin the failure on JFK, the book states something that is simply not accurate: “The Secret Service was not authorized to override a presidential decision.” (p. 9) Yet Rowley said before the Commission that, “No president will tell the Secret Service what they can or cannot do.” Rowley’s predecessor, U. E. Baughman, said the same thing in his book Secret Service Chief. Which was published before the assassination and contained some criticisms of the Secret Service’s performance in Dallas. Harry Truman said the same thing. (ibid)
In the book, Blaine goes as far as to claim that there was a meeting on 11/25/63 where at least seven agents decided to cover up Kennedy’s order. (p. 17) As Palamara points out, the only surviving member in 2010 was Blaine. But further, there is no record that a such a meeting ever took place. And as Palamara notes, some of the people who were supposed to be there deny that it was needed because Kennedy never said any such thing. But Blaine uses this meeting to go after Palamara. He wrote that because they were ordered to cover up JFK’s order, certain agents told the interviewer false information and Palamara used it “to stab them—and their brothers—in the back with baseless accusations.” (p. 21)
What undermines this further is that certain witnesses who were not from the Secret Service said the same thing to Palamara—that Kennedy did not interfere with the Secret Service procedure. A couple of examples being Pierre Salinger and Marty Underwood. And if the secret pledge meeting was so binding, then why did Rowley submit the five sets of notes he did to the Warren Commission? (Blaine says these were declassified in 1992.)
Blaine writes that it was Winston Lawson who conveyed to Sam Kinney that the bubble top to the limousine should not be in use that day. Kinney said that this was not the case. This was purely his decision and no one else’s. Further, that top was used much more often than Blaine implies. (p. 24)
All in all, Palamara gives the book a slap in the face. In summary, he calls it well written with some nice pictures. But it is “really a thinly veiled attempt to rewrite history.” And he compares it to other such rewrites like Gerald Posner and Vincent Bugliosi. (p. 37)
But yet, the Discovery Channel made a documentary out of the book. Go figure.
III
The lack of men on the rear of the car was not the only failure of the Secret Service that day. The book spends a chapter trying to resolve the mystery of the reduction and misplacement of Kennedy’s motorcycle escort that day. As the author clearly delineates, the original design was to have four cycles on each side of the limo. This is what the Dallas Police had planned for in advance. Palamara has more than one source for this, including DPD Assistant Chief Charles Batchelor and Deputy Chief M. W. Stevenson. And this was in evidence before the assassination. (p. 98)
Again, with more than one source, the author states this was changed by the Secret Service, specifically by Winston Lawson. Lawson thought two would be sufficient. (ibid) Chief Jesse Curry specifically described this in his Commission testimony. He said, “…we had more motorcycles lined up to be with the president’s car, but the Secret Service didn’t want that many.” He said the DPD wanted four cyclists on each side, but they ended up with two. He added that the Secret Service “…asked us to drop out some of them and back down the motorcade, along the motorcade, which we did.” (p. 98)
Note the phrase, “…back down the motorcade”. Curry also adds that they asked them to remain at the rear fender. (p. 99) This instruction is corroborated by two police sources. Cyclist Marrion Baker told the Commission that his instructions were changed that day. Originally, he was told that he and his partner were to ride alongside the presidential limo. But that morning, when they got to Love Field, and Kennedy’s plane arrived, this was changed. They were told that “…there wouldn’t be anybody riding beside the president’s car.” (p. 92)
Motorcycle officer B. J. Martin said the same thing to the Commission. The Secret Service instructed them that they were to ride behind the limo, to the rear of the car. Martin then told his friend Jean Hill that they were ordered into the weirdest escort formation ever. For a normal procedure, the police would bracket the automobile with motorcycles. But in this case, at the airport, they were told there would be no forward escorts. They were instructed to stay well behind, and not get ahead of the limo’s rear wheels under any circumstances. (pp. 93-94)
Same with motorcycle officer Clyde Haygood. He was assigned to the right rear of the presidential limousine. Yet even though that was his assigned position, “…he was generally riding several cars back and offered no explanation for this.” Haygood was on Main Street during the fusillade. He and Baker were too far away to offer any kind of protection for Kennedy. (p. 95)
Again, what this did was to make the president more susceptible to a sniper. This time, it would be a shot from the side or from the grassy knoll. Which is where many writers think the fatal shot originated.
IV
And that is not all that was unusual about the motorcade that day. According to motorcycle officer Bobby Joe Dale, they had ridden with the Secret Service on possible routes about 72 hours before Kennedy arrived. There were three possible routes. But they were not told which one they were going to take. And Dale did not realize which one they were taking until they started out on it on the 22nd. Asst. Chief Charles Batchelor was very critical about this:
… the failure of the Secret Service to inform the police adequately in advance of the exact route to be taken by the president prevented them from adequately organizing their men and taking the necessary security precautions. (p. 95)
Sgt. Samuel Bellah reviewed the planned route the night before with his captain. The route was not the original one, which was to go straight through Dealey Plaza, skirting the Texas School Book Depository by a block. This altered route turned and passed right in front of the Depository. (ibid)
When the House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA) reviewed this question of the motorcade route and its passage through Dealey Plaza, they did not accept the Warren Commission explanation of why the infamous double turn onto Houston and then Elm was taken. Because contrary to the implication by agent Forrest Sorrels the Trade Mart
…was accessible from beyond the triple overpass in such a way that it was not necessary to enter the Elm Street ramp to the expressway. The motorcade could have progressed westward through Dealey Plaza on Main Street, passed under the overpass, and then proceeded on Industrial Boulevard to the Trade Mart. (HSCA Vol. 11, p. 522)
The idea that somehow the double turn was the only way to the Trade Mart from Main Street was a myth originated with and by the Warren Commission. Which apparently never even looked at a street map of the city to determine if such was really the case. Those two turns--slowing the car down to 11 mph, in front of a tall building, with a rolling hill and a fence upcoming-- should have been avoided at all costs. The only way it should have been accepted is if it was the only route available, and only then if there were enough men to cover the entire plaza to make sure there was no one on rooftops and no open windows. None of these conditions was in place that day. Therefore, that choice was not acceptable. It has to be categorized as another failure by the Secret Service. The HSCA considered it as such. They concluded that the motorcycle security measures used “…in Dallas by the Secret Service may have been uniquely insecure….” (p. 99)
We should add one last point on this issue. In reporter Seth Kantor’s notes, which Palamara includes, he wrote, “Will Fritz’s men called off nite before by SS. Had planned to ride close car w/machine guns in car behind Pres.” (p. 101)
V
And that is not all that was unusual about that particular motorcade that day. There was also the specific placement of certain individuals within the formation. For example, there was the issue of the press car or truck. Usually, this vehicle would go either at or near the front of the parade. But according to Dallas Morning News photojournalist Tom Dillard, that position was lost at the airport. Dillard said that usually this truck precedes the president, and certain press photographic reps are in that vehicle.
Dillard went on to say that this flatbed truck was cancelled that day at the last minute. (p. 100) Instead, they were placed into Chevy convertibles. In turn, this put them pretty much out of the picture. Palamara comments here that in previous trips, this press truck was very close, either in front of or behind the presidential limousine.
This was so unusual that some photographers complained about it. The AP’s Henry Burroughs found himself placed at about the number eleven position in the parade. He stated, “We protested, but it was too late.” (ibid) The closest press reps were 600 feet behind the Kennedys, and they could see little more than the mayor, who was directly ahead.
There was also the issue of Dr. George Burkley, the president’s personal physician. He felt he should be close to Kennedy at all times, and he was not in this motorcade. He was upset, and he protested that he could be of no assistance to the president if a doctor was quickly needed. (p. 101)
Without Palamara being declarative about it, what these two placements did was to reduce the picture coverage of the assassination scene, and hinder Kennedy’s personal physician from tendering immediate aid. The sheer amount of these malignant anomalies leaves the unstated question: was it all just a coincidence?
The author does not have a lot of kind words for Paul Landis. Landis is the Secret Service agent who belatedly said that he discovered an extra bullet in the back of the limousine. In 2023, when his book The Final Witness came out, Landis was actually given fair treatment by, of all places, the New York Times. And it was not just there. The book made headlines on CNN, NBC, People Magazine and other MSM venues. Landis was in the follow-up car just several feet from Kennedy’s limousine. In his book, he said that he found an intact bullet on the top of the back seat, above where the president was sitting.
As Palamara notes, although Landis stated that he thought shots came from the front, he had at least three opportunities to mention this extra bullet, originating as early as November 27, 1963. He did not. Nor did he do so when interviewed by the HSCA. (p. 57) It was not until 2016 that he began to question in public the Single Bullet Theory.
When the book came out, Clint Hill denounced it on NBC Nightly News:
I believe it raises concerns when the story he is telling now, 60 years after the fact, is different than the statements he wrote in the days following the tragedy. (p. 63)
The main point of contention that Palamara has is that Landis previously said that the intact bullet had been a fragment. And he quotes Landis as saying so prior.
Both Landis and Hill were out drinking the night before the assassination. There were nine agents at The Cellar into the wee hours of the morning. Four of whom were in the follow-up car the next day. Palamara notes that both Landis and Blaine discount this sorry episode. But Landis does admit that he got no sleep that night. Which leaves the question: is this why Hill was the only agent to react decisively?
I wish Palamara had made more of the disclosures about James Mastrovito by the Review Board. Joan Zimmerman discovered that Mastrovito got rid of 5-6 file cabinets of Secret Service materials. This included a vial containing a portion of Kennedy’s brain. Mastrovito went on to a career in the CIA as a former member of Kennedy’s White House detail. From my sources, the Board was very interested in this lead and tried to follow up on it.
Finally, I also wish Palamara had steered clear of the whole Marilyn Monroe morass. As I have written, this is a deliberate quicksand pool created by mostly hack writers. And Palamara used one of the worst, Ron Kessler. (p. 157) The illustrious Don McGovern has noted, by going through presidential appointment books and two Marilyn Monroe day-by-day guides, that there is only one occasion on which JFK and MM could have had a dalliance. And even that is contested by fellow authority Gary Vitacco Robles.
All in all, this is a good send-off for Vince Palamara. There is a lot of incisive material packed into a relatively brief 207 pages. Palamara makes the cogent point that the Commission, and the HSCA, let the Secret Service off much too easily. At the very least, they were guilty of negligence.
