The Depleted Patrols in Dallas on November 22, 1963

In my very first article for Kennedysandking, “The Tippit Tapes”, I set out how Officers JD Tippit (district 78) and Ron Nelson (district 87) were not dispatched from those home districts from far south Dallas at 12:45 pm to “Central Oak Cliff”. Yet Dallas Police patrol radio dispatcher Murray Jackson had claimed they were.

Nelson said to CBS in 2013 that he was on the west side of the Commerce viaduct at 12:30 pm (the south side of the Trinity River, which is district 108). He said he heard the assassination shots and drove into Dealey Plaza within a minute to see people still cowering on the ground. Tippit was at the Gloco Gas Station (also district 108). Both men were thus several miles north of their home districts.

Firstly, I must refute any inference that some researchers have drawn that Tippit patrolling on his own was unusual. There were three shifts in a day. The 4 pm to midnight, and midnight to 8:00 am patrols had pairs in a car due to night work being seen as more dangerous. On November 22, 1963, Tippit was working a day shift, where pairing was the exception, not the norm.

What is new in this article is the extent to which southwest Dallas was depleted of patrol officers. The details for that are at the end of this article as an Appendix.

Researcher and Warren Commission supporter Dale Myers interviewed Jackson and supported Jackson’s account. Which was that Jackson had called them away from their home districts because Oak Cliff was bereft of officers and Oak Cliff was a likely getaway area in light of the shooting in Dealey Plaza.

But when Chief Jesse Curry testified to the Warren Commission on April 15, 1963 (WC IV p192), he confirmed Oak Cliff was a ‘center of activity’ at the time Tippit was sent there.

Mr. MCCLOY. When Officer 78, that is Tippit, was directed to the Oak Cliff area that was simply because the Oak Cliff area was sort of a center of activity at that point?

Mr. CURRY. At that time.

Mr. MCCLOY. It wasn’t – it wasn’t because you were trying to or had any idea that the suspect might have been there?

Mr. CURRY. Not from the Presidential shooting, but we were sure that the suspect in the Officer Tippit shooting was in the central area.

Mr. MCCLOY. But Tippit was still alive on the first direction to go out there?

Mr. CURRY. That was because some of the squad had been moved out of the Oak Cliff into the Dallas area. You see, this is across the river.

Mr. MCCLOY. What is the Oak Cliff area?

Mr. RANKIN. I think that ought to be clarified. Chief Curry.

Having denied that a suspect from the Presidential assassination was the catalyst for sending Tippit there, Curry then said that the suspect who shot Tippit was suspected of being in that area. Hence, McCloy’s sarcastic interjection that Tippit must have been alive when he was sent there.

Curry’s answers are remarkable. As I set out later, Oak Cliff was indeed a ‘center of activity’. It was packed with police officers before Tippit was shot.

Jackson’s explanation falls over for at least three reasons, and I have not seen any adjustment of Myers’ conclusions in the light of all the emerging facts. A crucial point is what Nelson himself said in 2013, shortly before he died.

Tippit and Nelson moved out of their districts off radio

The time of movement aspect is not true, by the account of Nelson, nor the true position of Tippit, because they’d have had to have already left their own districts well before 12:45 pm to be where they were. Neither of those discrepancies came to the attention of the Warren Commission.

Central Oak Cliff was the one place not short of officers

The depletion aspect is not true either. Linked here and reproduced below is a map from the time. (The high resolution is needed to read the landmarks and streets separating districts.)

My annotations show the significant lack of officers patrolling their allocated districts for southwest Dallas as a whole. There were 27 districts south of the Trinity River, being : 21-23 (Northwest Platoon command), 76-79, 81-89, 91-98 (Southwest Platoon command) and 108-109 (Downtown Platoon command). Due to the shape of the City of Dallas, there was no Southeast command.

There were also four districts, 71-75, north of the river, which fell under the Southwest Platoon command. (That command being for the 70s, 80s and 90s sequences). Those 4 districts were also vacant of patrols as the relevant officers, Cox, Wise, and Sebastian, had been allocated motorcycle outrider duties for the motorcade.

Therefore, only three officers were covering about 400 square miles, in six districts out of 31. (Dallas-Fort Worth is a huge metroplex covering almost 9,000 square miles.)

The Trinity River is the purple/blue line.

The three officers in their designated districts are shown as the light green figure of eight (two districts each). Mentzel’s district 91 is red.

The yellow area is north of the river, but under SW Dallas platoon command (hence also under Sgt Hugh Davis). Again, with no overt officers. It contains Industrial Boulevard.

Officer Mentzel and Central Oak Cliff

WD Mentzel (districts 91 and 92 at the center of Oak Cliff) was said to be at lunch and incommunicado from 12:30 pm. Mentzel’s absence from - overt - service meant only six districts were overtly patrolled.

I covered Mentzel’s inconsistent accounts in another K&K article, “The Missing Calls of Officer Mentzel”. He wasn’t incommunicado. That was a fiction maintained by not transcribing the radio calls he made.

That left two unnamed officers patrolling the peripheral districts of 88/89/and 97/98, plus RW Walker in 85/85, which was south of the Santa Fe Railroad. Jackson, like Curry, was also wrong regarding Oak Cliff itself being depleted. It had officers – Tippit (78), Angell (81), Parker (56) and Lewis (35) - doing covert and unusual things, outside of their allocated districts. In the case of Parker and Lewis, they are on the wrong side of the river.

Plus, there was Officer Mentzel with his dubious lunch story near the Texas Theater in his District 91. There was also off-duty officer Harry Olsen somewhere near Lansing and Eighth, also in district 91. Then there was Officer Charles T Walker, from the motor accident branch at the junction of E 10^th and Jefferson at the southern edge of district 91.

The ‘getaway’ zone - Jackson

Nelson’s account from 2013 means his appearance in the third official transcript almost has to have been a faked call. It is not Nelson’s voice. By that measure, Tippit’s was likely faked, too, masking that he was at Gloco. That voice is also different. (See Joseph McBride, Into the Nightmare, p. 425 for this issue; see also Sylvia Meagher, Accessories After the Fact, pp. 262-63)

But that call does use Jackson’s voice. By that, Jackson wasn’t merely covering up the real reasons for the movements of Tippit but was complicit in making that call, which was retrospectively added to the tape and the transcript of it. The question, therefore, arises whether he was also complicit in the pre-emptive draining of much of Southwest Dallas’ patrol cover.

A further giveaway is that the obvious way to boost patrol cover in Oak Cliff would have been to call Mentzel from his supposed lunch. Mentzel was making calls on the patrol radio immediately after the assassination at 12:30 pm. But those calls were not transcribed, thus helping the story that he was incommunicado, despite the fact that he wasn’t. Half past noon can be lunchtime for a 9-to-5 job. But the day shift that day was 7:00 am to 3 pm. No other officer was having lunch from 12:30 pm.

But even if Mentzel were to have been back on duty at 1:00 pm, he would be off lunch by the time Nelson and Tippit could arrive; had they really been in their home districts when supposedly called at 12:45 pm. Whichever way one looks at it, either Nelson in 2013, or Jackson in 1963/64 were untruthful. None of the evidence vindicates Jackson’s story.

Jackson said he sent Nelson and Tippit --which we know he didn’t--as Oak Cliff was a likely getaway area. That is strategically correct, and I believe that can be played against him, as I set out later.

Researcher Dale Myers – “Move Downtown”

I have used the same sources as Myers CE2645, plus Captain Charles Talbert’s FBI statement (page 50) of June 2, 1964, and DPD patrol tapes and transcripts. To his credit, Myers does agree that a call at 12:47 pm of “87. ON, south end of Houston Street viaduct” was Nelson (87), not Officer Bass (101).

The mistranscription of Nelson to Bass occurred before the third transcript. Without the faked call, a question would arise as to how Nelson had managed to be there within 2 minutes of being told to go to Oak Cliff from District 87. But the faked 12:45 pm call location - Marsalis at RL Thornton – gives a superficial appearance that Nelson could just about have covered the distance in 2-3 minutes. As perhaps Myers realized in having no qualms about revealing that the tape was mistranscribed for that call.

One would expect, in the light of such a serious mistranscription, that Myers would have subjected all of the tape to such scrutiny for other cases of that occurring. I do not see evidence of his doing that. Instead, he gives latitude to police versions of events that still do not stand up.

For example. I have not seen Myers mention the mistranscription of this significant command at 12:44 pm from Jackson. The transcripts state (my underlines):

“Attention all squads, report to downtown area, Code 3 (Emergency - red lights and sirens) to Elm and Houston, with caution.”

But what is actually very clear on the tape is:

“Attention all squads in the downtown area: Code 3 to Elm and Houston with caution.”

The distinction between phrases ‘report to” and ‘in the’ is important. The mistranscription provides a reason for a mass exodus of officers from far-flung parts of Dallas to Dealey Plaza. The true command, which only applied to those officers already downtown, does not.

Further, if Myers was able to determine that the 12:47 pm was Nelson’s and not Bass’s voice, why has he not identified that the 12:45 pm call is not Nelson’s young-sounding Texan voice either? The age --older man--and accent are different. Nelson’s voice is pleasant-sounding. The voice on the tape at 12:45 pm is not.

The essence of detective work is looking for inconsistencies in what suspects say. In the case of Dallas on November 22, 1963, the inconsistencies are in what certain police officers did and said.

Industrial Boulevard – Officer Angell

As set out earlier, with districts 71-75 free of officers, there was no patrol coverage of the industrial zones north of the Trinity River. There is a call from Jackson as the Dispatcher ordering all emergency vehicles to stay off Industrial Boulevard (now called South Riverfront Boulevard) at 12:36 pm. That is included in District 73.

“Attention all emergency equipment. Attention all emergency equipment. Do not use Industrial Boulevard. Do not use Industrial Boulevard.”

There is then this at 12:45 pm 81 (JL Angell) “ We're going north on Industrial from Corinth”.”

Thus, Angell appears to have disobeyed orders. The tape puts someone in the car with him. But it was transcribed in CE 1974 as “I’ll be going north on Industrial from Corinth”.

As I cover later, this is not a one-off discrepancy so far as Angell is concerned.

Was Industrial Boulevard a getaway route for shooters? Angell went there circuitously.

Angell’s zig-zag route

Angell at 12:42 pm (untranscribed and mistranscribed by Shearer as ‘ Corinth and Eighth’), said “we’re still at Lansing and Eighth”. That is the same place Tippit’s last call was at 12:53 pm (in that case, transcribed as Lancaster and Eighth).

Angell’s districts (81 and 82 ) were also south of the Santa Fe Railroad between Zang and Corinth. Taking account of the railroad, the normal grid of streets is broken. From west to east, only Zang, Beckley, Marsalis, Ewing, Moore, and Corinth cross it.

With the Trinity River providing another barrier, then if Angell was heading - on instruction or of his own accord - from districts 81/82 to Dealey Plaza, then, if he was westwards, anywhere near Zang, Beckley or Marsalis, his route would then be over Houston St or Commerce viaducts (only Houston viaduct if he was on Marsalis). If he were eastwards near Corinth, then the Corinth viaduct would be the route. 

The irregularities abound

Firstly, Angell was not just passing by Lansing and Eighth as he said he was “still” at that place.  Then he moved east to the Corinth Street viaduct. But the direct route to Dealey Plaza from Lansing Street (one block west of Marsalis) would be over the Houston Street viaduct. He then used Industrial Boulevard despite the command for emergency vehicles not to use it. The route he took was almost twice the distance.

None of that was questioned by Jackson as the dispatcher. Despite Angell saying “still”, Jackson was not surprised Angell was there. Nor did Jackson query why Angell had zig-zagged to Corinth. Nor did Jackson query why Angell was using Industrial Boulevard. Just as Jackson did not challenge why Nelson was on the south end of the Houston Street viaduct. Just as Jackson did not recall Mentzel from ‘lunch’.

The leaving out of the transcripts the fact that Angell was at Lansing and Eighth gives the impression he was moving from his district 81 along Corinth. It also covers up the fact that Angell at 12:42 pm was in the same place that Tippit was at 12:53 pm, his last call before being shot.

Mistranscriptions do not appear to be mistakes, as they have the effect of making the irregularities appear less obvious.

The command and control of Dallas patrols

In my K&K article “The Death of Tippit,” I set out how the command of the SW Dallas Platoon had been changed on November 22, 1963.

Lieutenant Fulgham was sent to traffic school at Northwestern University, Illinois. His role was taken over that day by Sergeant Bud Owens. One of the three Sergeants, Don Steele, was off duty. That left Sergeant Hugh Davis in charge of the 80s and 90s districts. Sgt. Bud Owens was in charge of the 70s districts but said to the Warren Commission that control over Tippit passed to the same Sergeant as Angell (81), which makes it Davis. Owens said he could not furnish a reason. Owens had been sent to the depository.

The standing down of Owens across lunchtime meant that Davis (80) was supervising control of half of Dallas, with a depleted number of officers. But despite that, he makes just two appearances on patrol radio at 12:38 pm and 12:43 pm when he said, “80 Clear” and then “80 Code 5”. He remained silent thereafter, even though one of his officers was shot dead. 

CE2645 states that Davis, too, had been sent to the Depository, which is itself extraordinary, given there were only three officers left in the whole of southwest Dallas. But the question arises: Where was Davis in fact? Owens had been at the Depository until the call that Tippit had been shot came over the patrol radio. At 1:42 pm, Owens asked where Davis was, as Tippit’s wife needs to be told he is dead. Owens seems to have been in the dark. Nothing was forthcoming.

As well as the question ‘Where was Davis?’, the question arises: Who was not in the dark as to what was going on in southwest Dallas?

To answer that question, one needs to look in part at Captain Cecil E Talbert. Three Captains, Talbert, Souter and Williams were in charge of all patrols on a rotating basis, as there were three shifts in a day.

Talbert’s FBI statement, page 59, is the basis of much of CE2645. Talbert only testified concerning the events of Sunday, November 11, the murder of Oswald by Jack Ruby. It’s not, therefore, possible to deduce anything from him or about him firsthand, other than the contents of his FBI statement and CE2645.

But amongst the gross irregularities I have identified in this article, one stands out. Talbert failed to refer to Owens’ relinquished command, and we only know of that because of what Owens said in giving testimony.

Talbert was an early arrival at the Depository and is hands on the radio regularly throughout the events. He drove to the Tippit murder scene and then the Texas Theater. Chief Jesse Curry testified on April 15, 1964 (WC Vol XII, p25) and confirmed that Talbert was also in charge of the protection of Oswald in the basement when he was shot by Jack Ruby.

Given what was going on on November 22 and November 24^th, and given the misleading accounts afterwards, it is logical to suggest that Talbert was an active participant in the nefarious activities. Any competent and honest commander should have been able to see then what is apparent now.

Dale Myers also claims to have written the definitive book on the shooting of Tippit. I therefore find it peculiar that he does not mention that the command over the subject of his book changed over lunchtime on November 22, from Owens to Davis.

What might depletion of a getaway area achieve?

The depletion could achieve these things:

Provide cover for any officers acting covertly in Oak Cliff in the run-up to and immediately after the assassination.

That means no regular officer would intrude on whatever Mentzel, Tippit and others were up to in District 91. District 91 includes the Texas Theater, 1026 N Beckley, E10th, as well as Olsen’s location near Lansing and Eighth. Tippit and Angell went there too.

I do not believe that Davis was at the Depository. No one answered the question of Owens as to where Davis was. If Jackson knew, he should have said. If Jackson didn’t know, he should have asked. Jackson likely knew but wouldn’t say.

On the basis of my previous research, something shortly after the assassination caused Tippit to behave erratically and head to Lansing and Eighth. One possible conclusion is that he went there to meet his command, Davis, and something in that interaction caused the ambush and elimination of Tippit. It is inexplicable as to why Davis--the person in covert control of Tippit at the time Tippit was murdered-- filed no report and was not put forward to testify.

The Industrial Boulevard area (73-74) would be free of officers. 

Industrial Boulevard, and the road to Houston, headed southeast, would be free of patrols. Parkland and the airport, being in NW Dallas, are in the opposite direction. One would not expect pre-planned getaways to go in the direction of legitimate assassination response activity.

Depleting the adjacent districts before 1:00 pm would limit the first responders in the vicinity of the Texas Theater.

Only Mentzel, Tippit, CT Walker and RW Walker had proximity. Therefore, any planned assault on the Texas Theater (district 91) to deal with Oswald could be controlled with only the desired officers arriving as first responders. RW Walker was districts 85/86. It is not possible to determine what he was doing until after the Tippit shooting announcement was made. By the patrol radio, he was on Jefferson approximately three minutes after Bowley’s first call of approximately 1:12 pm, declaring the shooting at 410 E 10^th near the corner with Patton. Dispatch then put out conflicting locations of the shooting (telephone calls were also coming in), and Walker said: “85: I don't see anything on Jefferson yet”.

Given his home districts were on the other side of the Santa Fe Railroad, he could only have left his districts via Zang, Beckley or Marsalis. His travel time to Jefferson could have been three minutes. He was then immediately asked by dispatch to “check 501 East Tenth at Denver.” However, Jackson then immediately announced, “Suspect just passed 401 East Jefferson”. That is the Ballew gas station at the corner of Crawford and E Jefferson. One block from Patton and two from Crawford

Within a minute of that, Walker then announced, “We have a description on this suspect over here on Jefferson. Last seen about 300 block of East Jefferson. He's a white male, about thirty, five eight, black hair, slender, wearing a white jacket, a white shirt and dark slacks”.

He made that announcement in the minute before the arrival at the Tippit murder scene at 410 E 10^th of Officers Jez and Poe (105) and then Owens (19), seconds apart: at approximately 1:16 pm.

That is consistent with Walker approaching E10th and Patton from the south rather than then encountering Warren Reynolds, who, from the 500 block of Jefferson, had heard the shots, seen the fugitive running and followed him along the 400 block to Ballew, a distance of approximately 400 yards. Whereas cars 105 and 19 had arrived from downtown in the north. From the announcements on the tape and the times on the tape, RW Walker did not have time to go, nor did he say he went, to 410 E. 10th until after having dealt with the scene at Ballew.

That scenario stacks up with Warren Reynolds’ statement, as well as Mary Brock at Bellew. Mary Brock said that the first officer told her that the shooting was of a police officer. That is rational given Bowley’s call and four subsequent calls had made clear the victim was a police officer. One of which said the officer was dead.

I cannot conclude whether RW Walker was left in his districts so as to be a desirable first responder for planned action at the Texas Theater. He does not seem to have entered the Theater, though he arrived there quickly after the first radio announcement that someone had entered the Texas Theater. And he was at 2:00 pm, sent to 2400 East Ledbetter, hence back in service for his home districts 10 minutes after the arrest of Oswald.

However, Talbert’s reasoning for officer placings says:

CE2645 RW Walker. Districts 85-85, Car 127. Assigned to remain in district to answer calls in regard to suspects.

That begs the question as to why Walker was assigned to answer “calls in regard to suspects”. What suspects? There are no relevant calls on the tapes for Walker. How could that have been predicted, and why was that a reason given that all other near districts had been depleted of officers?

Just as Jesse Curry couldn’t give a credible answer to McCloy as to why Tippit was sent to Oak Cliff, Talbert’s explanation regarding RW Walker isn’t clear either.

Conclusion

What I have set out above is based on circumstantial evidence. But it is based on corrected evidence that has erstwhile been misrepresented by various parties, including by the Dallas Police Department to the Warren Commission.

Appendix – movement of officers

*Owens lost command of Tippit over lunch break to Davis.