The Death of Tippit - Part 3

By John Washburn

My prior articles covered unusual movements of particular police officers in the period up to the death of Tippit and the 20 or so minutes immediately afterward. 

The focus of this article is whether those officers also display peculiarities in the period up to and including the arrest of Oswald at the Theater.

THE MOBIL GARAGE AT 10^TH AND BECKLEY

In my William Mentzel article, I gave a reason why Tippit would drive from Top Ten Records to E 10th Street via Sunset Avenue rather than the more obvious route via West 10^th.  I deduced that because the Sunset route was the route Louis Cortinas said he took to get from Top Ten Records to the Tippit murder scene at 400 block E10th, on hearing of the shooting there. The route via Sunset would avoid the traffic lights at W 10^th Street and Zang Boulevard. Those at Top Ten Records who saw Tippit leave there said he left at speed, hence it follows that Tippit would also have gone for the fastest route.

I posited that he rendezvoused with Mentzel at E 10th and Beckley at 1:07 pm before then setting off to an ambush further east along E 10th approximately two minutes later. [https://www.kennedysandking.com/john-f-kennedy-articles/the-missing-calls-of-officer-mentzel-pt-1]

The testimony of Officer Hutson (credit to Education Forum member Steve Thomas) reveals that there was a Mobil gas station at 10^th and Beckley. This map shows the current site.

HUTSON, HAWKINS AND BAGGETT

The testimony of Officer Hutson (Vol VII p 26)  was taken at 9:00 am April 3, 1963 by Counsel Belin. Hutson said that he arrived at that gas station with officers Hawkins and Baggett. Hutson said the other two officers got out of the car to make a landline call and were inside the premises when the alarm regarding a suspect at the Marsalis Library came over the patrol radio. Hutson said he sounded the siren to get their attention. That event occurred at approximately 1:30 pm.

Hutson had appeared in my prior article because his Warren Commission testimony contradicted Reserve Sgt. Croy’s description of traffic conditions on Main Street. Hutson’s testimony set out how he, as a three-wheel motorcycle patrol officer, hitched a car ride with Hawkins and Baggett after he’d arrived in Oak Cliff. He did that as his clutch had burnt out.

Hutson’s testimony indicates that he arrived at the 400 block of E Jefferson sometime before 1:30 pm and then went to the Mobil location with Hawkins and Baggett from where he heard the library call (which turned out to be a false alarm) on patrol radio at 1:30 pm. 

Hutson’s testimony also indicates there may be calls missing from the tape and transcripts. He said, “I believe they gave us a call for us to call. I mean, their number to call in.” 

No such calls remain on transcribed tapes. 

Contrast that with Officer Hawkins, who omitted any mention of the Mobil incident. His testimony (WC Vol VII, p. 91) was taken at 9:50 am on 3 April 1963 by Counsel Ball.  I set out the relevant extract so as to convey the lack of precision in his movements and the glaring omission of the incident at the Mobil Garage.

Mr. BALL. Tell me, did you receive any instructions as to what to do?

Mr. HAWKINS. No, sir, I did not.

They called—I heard a citizen come in on the radio and state that an officer had been shot, and it looked like he was dead.

We had just finished the accident at this time, and I was driving an officer, Baggett, and I proceeded to Oak Cliff to the general vicinity of the call after checking out with the dispatcher, stating that we were proceeding in that direction.

We arrived in Oak Cliff, and there were several squads in the general vicinity of where the shooting had occurred- different stories had come out that the person was- the suspect had been seen in the immediate vicinity.

Mr. BALL. Did you go to 10th and Patton?

Mr. HAWKINS. We drove by 10th and Patton—we didn't stop at the location.

Mr. BALL. What did you do then?

Mr. HAWKINS.  We circled the vicinity around Jefferson and Marsalis and in that area, talking to several people on the street, asking if they had seen anyone running up the alley or running down the street, and then they received a call, or I believe Officer Walker put out a call that he had just seen a white man running to the Oak Cliff Library, at which time we proceeded to this location. Officer Hutson had gotten into the car with us when we arrived in Oak Cliff, and there were three of us in the squad car- Officer Baggett, Officer Hutson, and myself.

Mr. BALL. Hutson is also a patrolman?

Mr. HAWKINS. Yes, sir.

Mr. BALL. A uniformed patrolman?

Mr. HAWKINS. Yes, sir; he is a three-wheel officer. We went to the library, and this turned out to be an employee of the library who had heard of the news and was apparently running in the library to tell the other employees there.

We then, after this checked out, we then continued circling in the area around 10th and Patton and Marsalis and Jefferson.

We then heard on the police radio that a suspicious person was at the TexasTheatre, and at this time, we proceeded to the theatre.

Ball – one of the more challenging of all counsel - would not have been aware of this omission because Hawkins’ testimony was taken in the same hour with different counsel.

Hawkins, referring to ‘circle[d] the vicinity of Marsalis and Jefferson’, which is where the library was, avoids the fact he’d been half a mile west at the gas station and that Hutson had to set off the siren to get him out of the shop  

Hawkins’ actions also need to be seen in the light of the call he put out on Channel 2, DPD time 1:30 pm. Bear in mind that there is no reference to Westbrook directly or indirectly before this call on either Channel 1 or 2.

221 (Patrolmen R. HAWKINS and E. R. BAGGETT) Can you give Captain WESTBROOK any information as to where he was shot?

Dispatcher (Henslee). Repeat. 

221 (Patrolmen R. HAWKINS and E. R. BAGGETT) Can you give Captain WESTBROOK any information as to where this happened?

Dispatcher (Henslee). In the 400 block of East 10^th near Patton.

15 (Captain C. E. TALBERT). Did you say he was DOA (Dead On Arrival) at Methodist?

The wording indicates Hawkins was with Westbrook in person to make that call on his behalf. But Hawkins’ question is extraordinary given that Westbrook, by his Warren Testimony, already knew the location where Tippit was shot. It had been on patrol radio, and Owens drove him there. Hawkins also knew the location. He’d been to 10^th and Patton and drove by the murder scene.

The dispatcher seems to have done a double take. The first question, “where was he shot” could be interpreted as was he “shot in the head”?  But the rephrasing the second time around, “where this happened,” removed such ambiguity.  

Hawkins should have wondered why he had to ask the same question twice. As we shall see, Hawkins is also a person of interest as he handcuffed Oswald on arrest. 

It is not possible to ascertain whether by 1:30 pm, Channel 2 DPD time was in step with real time or Channel 1’s still tampered time. However, there is a benchmark. 

Both Channels had a command to cut sirens on Hines Boulevard. The odd Westbrook call was a minute before that. The library call – where Hutson places them at Mobil – was a minute after the Hines call. That odd call on Channel 2, therefore, times as approximately 1:28 pm, which fits with Westbrook’s second arrival in Oak Cliff.

To recap on the calls that were on Channel 1.

1:29     The Hines cut sirens call.

1:30     CT Walker. “223, he's in the library at Jefferson -- east 500 block Marsalis and Jefferson”. That is the time Hutson, Hawkins, and Baggett were at the Mobil gas station, 10^th and Beckley.

1:31     Owens. “We’re all at the library”.

1:35     Westbrook (550) made a call “What officer have you got commanding this area over here where this officer was shot?” area over here where this officer was shot?” Then Owens and others return to 410 E 10^th. There is then more WFAA-TV (Reiland) footage, which showed Westbook, Poe, Owens, and Croy examining a wallet at the scene. 

Westbrook testified that after the library incident, he was in the vicinity of Crawford Street and Storey Street. Those locations are, respectively, two blocks and one block from the Mobil gas station. He gave the Warren Commission no clear reason why he would have been there. 

Mr. BALL. Now, you came from the library—where is that library?

Mr. WESTBROOK. The library is at Marsalis and Jefferson, sir. It must be here on Turner Plaza, right here.

Mr. BALL. You drove west on Jefferson, did you?

Mr. WESTBROOK. We drove west on Jefferson.

Mr. BALL. And you got out of the car where?

Mr. WESTBROOK. We got out of the car about here [indicating].

Mr. BALL. At what street?

Mr. WESTBROOK. It was between two streets, and I would say it was between this Storey and Crawford.

Mr. BALL. Why did you get out of the car at that time?

Mr. WESTBROOK. Just more or less searching- just no particular reason- just searching the area.

Mr. BALL. You were just looking around to see what you could see?

Mr. WESTBROOK. Yes, and at this time, I had a shotgun—I had borrowed a shotgun from a patrolman.

Mr. BALL. Where did you go when you got out of the car?

Mr. WESTBROOK. I walked through, and this is a car lot or a parking area, right along in here, and I don't know whether I am wrong on my location or not, but I think I'm right.

SUMMARY

Summarising all of that in order to try to make some sense of it. 

Westbrook arrived in Oak Cliff twice. The first time, he arrived with Owens. He then went back to the Depository, returning in Car 207. On his second arrival in an unmarked car, he made contact with Hawkins, and at approximately 1:28 pm, he asked Hawkins to put out a call on Channel 2, which gave the impression this was his first arrival in Oak Cliff. 

Hawkins then went to the Mobil gas station and made a landline call. Westbrook was then in the area towards the Mobil gas station. Thereafter, Westbrook was present for the discovery of a planted wallet at the Tippit murder scene, and then Westbrook also discovered a jacket.

Westbrook later tried to cover up the finding of the jacket and the wallet. Hawkins covered up making a call from the Mobil garage and placed himself six blocks away to the east. 

WESTBROOK, THE JACKET, and WALLET

Westbrook’s subterfuge is betrayed by the Reiland TV film (the wallet) and the submission to the Warren Commission regarding the jacket. As Henry Hurt so ably pointed out, this jacket had two laundry marks on it.  The FBI visited over 700 establishments in Dallas and New Orleans.  They could not find one that could match either mark. (Reasonable Doubt, p. 151) Further, the FBI could not find any other article of Oswald’s clothing with a laundry or dry-cleaning mark. As Hurt also notes, the Commission made no mention of the extensive –and failed- FBI effort to find a match.  In a real investigation, Westbrook would have been pointedly interrogated about this lacuna.

The evidence would seem to suggest a situation whereby Hawkins, Westbrook, and others were communicating to put the final phase of the original plan in place. As many have theorized, the plan being the elimination of Oswald at the Texas Theater; after the appearance of a decoy to give the impression that Oswald had arrived on his own shortly before his arrest.  Were that the intended plan, then there would be the unexpected difficulty of more officers being in the area due to the impromptu killing of Tippit, and the decoy being on the run from the Tippit murder scene.

An operation like that would require two things. A group of accomplice officers would need to be the first to arrive at the Texas Theater, to secure the decoy and deal with Oswald. Meanwhile, other officers would need to be distracted to go elsewhere by false alarms. 

There is support for both in the evidence. 

From Hutson’s testimony:

Mr. Hutson. Yes, sir. Then, we left that location as we were proceeding west on East Jefferson, and as we approached the 100 block of East Jefferson, the radio dispatcher said that a suspect had just entered the Texas Theater.

The 100 block of E Jefferson was just two blocks east of the Theater, which was in the 200 block of W Jefferson. East and West Jefferson meet at Beckley. That indicates Hawkins was already headed west towards the Texas Theater before the radio dispatch call at 1:45 pm made it a place of interest. 

However, Hawkins said of that,

We then heard on the police radio that a suspicious person was at the Texas Theatre, and at this time we proceeded to the theatre.”

Hawkins omitted that he was headed towards the Texas Theater, before the call on police radio.  

NO FUGITIVE BUT FALSE ALARMS

There were also false alarms. It is relevant which officers made those false alarms. 

For the fugitive - by the Warren Commission version of events – to have got to the Texas Theater on foot, he would have had to cross the six lanes of Zang Boulevard and the four lanes of Beckley Avenue. Either crossing would be conspicuous. Also, something Commission zealots do not like to admit, the distance from 10^th and Patton to the theatre is significantly less than from the Beckley boarding house to the Tippit murder scene. It was possible to get there in 10-11 minutes.

Assistant Counsel Liebeler commented on that. 

“Then I was surprised to learn that the police radio did not send out information about the suspect being in the Texas Theater until 1:45, about 30 minutes after the police first learned of the Tippit killing from Benavides over Tippit's radio. What were Oswald and Brewer doing during this 30 minutes? Oswald was strangely inactive during this period, considering all that he had done in the 45 minutes following the assassination.”

Let us speculate: a reason for the lack of detection in that half hour because the fugitive was being held safely – in a vehicle - before the final part of the tableau was played out?

Altogether, there were four false alarms directing police to the east and north of the Tippit murder scene, away from Beckley and Zang. Each false alarm was made by a person of interest, and as covered later, each person was one of the early arrivals at the theater.

1. The furniture stores in 400 block E Jefferson, the alarm led by Hill,
2. Officer McDonald put out a call telling people to go to the (Abundant Life) Church at E10th and Crawford, 
3. CT Walker put out an announcement that the fugitive was in the Library at Marsalis and Jefferson. 
4. At approximately 1:40 pm, Westbrook (using 550) put out an announcement: 550: ...and work to North Jefferson. We've got a witness that seen him go north.

BACK TO MENTZEL

Despite Tippit being shot in Mentzel’s district 91, Mentzel himself made no declaration on the radio of where he was until after Oswald was arrested.

Until the Texas Theater (west of Beckley and Zang) became a point of interest after 1:40 pm, it’s difficult to see why Mentzel would - legitimately - stay away from the area of action, which was east of Beckley and Zang. 

Mentzel didn’t play an overt role in the arrest of Oswald, but he was in the vicinity of the theater. That’s apparent because after Oswald was arrested, Mentzel offered, over patrol radio, to deal with the car CT Walker had left behind at the theater. Walker having got into the car which carried Oswald to City Hall.

Again, let us speculate: could the purpose of Hill’s call “12^th and Beckley” have been to signal to confederates that the fugitive had been picked up safely? 12^thand Beckley was 250 yards from Hardy’s Shoe Store, 213 W Jefferson, two blocks north and one block west. Was Mentzel harboring the fugitive, having rendezvoused with Hill?

But prior to that, in my Mentzel article, there was a gap in my assumption as to the form of a trigger that could have caused Tippit to head east at the right time after a rendezvous with Mentzel. The “right time” being after the components of the ambush were in place.

I had deduced that Tippit was taking landline instruction from the phone at Top Ten Records, on East Jefferson.  Tippit merely needed to listen rather than saying anything.  This was at approximately 1:00 pm, departing two or three minutes later at speed. 

Mentzel, per CE 2645, was talking on the landline at Luby’s Cafeteria, also on E Jefferson, a short distance to the west of Top Ten Records. I assumed a rendezvous at the 10^th and Beckley (the Mobil Gas station) as that would account for several things.  

Firstly, why did Tippit leave Top Ten at speed only to then drive slowly along E 10th to his demise? The inference I drew was that he may have gotten new instructions by a rendezvous.

Secondly, Edgar Tippit, the victim’s father,  told author Joe McBride that an officer--all but certain Mentzel--was working with his son during Tippit’s last minutes alive. (McBride, Into the Nightmare, pp. 427-30) Both men were a short distance apart at Top Ten and Luby’s, close enough for a simple rendezvous.

However, if the objective was to get Tippit to 10^th and Beckley as a trap, then Mentzel would hardly be able to walk up to Tippit to say, “let’s go to E10^th and Beckley”. The fact that there was a landline at the gas station at E 10^th and Beckley ameliorates the problem. Mentzel, or possibly Tippit himself, would have been able to make a landline call from there, and that would have been the trigger for Tippit to head east.

Mentzel’s story that he was using the landline at Luby’s to get through to DPD HQ provided some cover for his having been seen using that landline.  Similarly, Mentzel’s statement in CE 2645 that he was cruising in the area of Zang and W10^th would give a degree of cover if it were to come out he’d been seen at the gas station on Beckley and E10th (those two locations are 150 yards apart). 

WHY DID TOP TEN ONLY EMERGE IN 1981?

The story regarding Tippit and Top Ten records didn’t come out until Earl Golz wrote about it in 1981. Some Dallas police officers must have known about Tippit and Top Ten. Louis Cortinas said he drove straight to the Tippit murder scene on hearing on the radio he had been shot. It would be apparent to him that he’d been one of the last people to see Tippit alive. Wouldn’t he have reported that at the scene?

But this memorandum from 3 December 1963 was sent by Carl Walters, a clerk to the Warren Commission, to the FBI Special Agent in Charge, Dallas Office. It concerns a phone call from a “John D Whitten” stating that Oswald was seen in Top Ten Records the morning of the assassination.

The Memorandum has the annotation “No Action - Oswald was at work all morning 11/22/63”. 

So, Top Ten Records was a place of interest in December 1963, and that memorandum provided evidence that Oswald was impersonated on the morning of the assassinations at a place in proximity to the Texas Theater. I return to this point later since there is also evidence that police officers searched the Texas Theater on the morning of the assassination. 

Interestingly, a John Whitten was a CIA officer assigned by CIA Director Richard Helms to review the CIA records on Oswald. Was he the source of the information? There is no – local - John Whitten in the Dallas City Directory for 1963. Researcher Bill Simpich thinks it is.

Whitten's preliminary finding that Oswald acted alone was delivered by Helms to President Lyndon Johnson the day Oswald was shot by Jack Ruby, 24 November 1963 [https://www.history-matters.com/essays/frameup/WhatJaneRomanSaid/WhatJaneRomanSaid_5.htm]

Whitten continued the investigation with a staff of 30. On December 6, Whitten read an FBI report on Oswald showing that the FBI had information about Oswald's links with pro-Castro Cuban groups, which neither the FBI nor Helms had communicated to his investigation. He complained to Helms and James Angleton that this information rendered his initial conclusion "completely irrelevant".

Helms took the investigation away from Whitten and handed it to Jim Angleton.

Whitten testified to the HSCA in 1979 that as soon as he learned he had been denied key files on Oswald, he complained to Helms. That was around Christmas time 1963. 

Whitten was never promoted again and took off to Vienna in self-imposed exile.  According to Jeff Morley, he became a singer.

THE ARREST - THE OFFICERS ENTERING THE TEXAS THEATER

A document for the FBI, written by James Bookhout, of 30 November 1963 states that Officers CT Walker, Hutson, McDonald and Hawkins were in on the arrest of Oswald.[https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/opastorage/live/9/4607/7460709/content/arcmedia/dc-metro/rg-272/605417-key-persons/mcdonald_m_n/mcdonald_m_n.pdf]

But Westbrook put himself there by his own account, as did Hill.

CT Walker on 2 December 1963 said [https://texashistory.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metapth339462/] he entered with Hutson and McDonald but omitted Hawkins. 

Hawkins on 2 December 1963 said  [https://texashistory.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metapth338399/m1/1/] he entered with Hutson, McDonald, and CT Walker.

McDonald on 3 December 1963 said [https://texashistory.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metapth340009/] he entered with “three others”. 

Hutson on 3 December 1963 said [https://texashistory.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metapth338138/m1/1/] he entered with Hawkins and CT Walker but omitted McDonald.

By the time of their Warren Commission testimonies, there were some changes to what these people said. Only CT Walker said the same as in December 1963. McDonald named three officers and said he entered with CT Walker, Hutson and Hawkins. Hutson again said he had entered with Hawkins but clarified that CT Walker and McDonald were joining them on the floor of the theater.  Hutson’s testimony is clearly articulated, internally consistent, and consistent with radio. It undermines those superior officers, displaying a pattern of inconsistent accounts. 

Jerry Hill, in his 5 December 1963 statement, stated [https://texashistory.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metapth337082/m1/1/] that he entered the front of the theater with Agent Bob Apple (there was no Warren testimony for Apple to check against). He immediately went to the balcony. Hill said Captain Talbert was there and asked if the roof had been checked. In that statement, Hill also said that the radio message that a suspect was in the theater came out at 1:55 pm. However, that call was, in fact, at 1:45 pm, and even the tampered DPD tape had corrected the time by then. 

McDonald said 2:00 pm was the time of entering the Texas Theater. That’s wrong - the time of entry was 1:50 pm. By 2:00 pm, Oswald was already being taken to City Hall. CT Walker said the 1:45 pm radio call was at 2:00 pm. Hawkins and Stringer were silent on the time. 

Contrast that with the 3 December 1963 statement of Hutson, who correctly puts the time of the 1:45 pm call as 1:45 pm. 

For Hill, McDonald, and CT Walker to all be adding 10-15 minutes to the real time is consistent with parties adding time to make the time of Tippit’s shooting appear later than it was. But in so doing, they did not realize that there would later be transcripts where the time stamps would synchronise with real time.  Because by 1:45 pm, those events were publicly verifiable. 

Making matters worse for Hill, McDonald, and CT Walker, is the fact that the three-quarter hour of 1:45 pm is a pretty easy time to remember.

HUTSON PULLED A GUN

Back to Hutson’s testimony, which said: [https://texashistory.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metapth338138/]

Mr. Hutson. Yes, sir. Then, we left that location as we were proceeding west on East Jefferson, and as we approached the 100 block of East Jefferson, the radio dispatcher said that a suspect had just entered the Texas Theatre.

…then……

Mr. HUTSON. We pulled up to this location, and I was the first out of the car to hit the ground. As I walked up to the fire exit doors, Officers Hawkins and Baggett were getting out of the car, and the door to the theater opened, and this unknown white male was exiting. I drew my pistol and put it on him and told him to put up his hands and not to make a move, and he was real nervous and scared and said: “I am not the one. I just came back to open the door. I work up the street at the shoe store, and Julia sent me back to open the door so you could get in.” I walked up and searched him briefly, and I could see by the description and his clothes that he wasn’t the person we were looking for. Then I entered the theater from this door, and Officer Hawkins with me, and Officer Baggett stayed behind to cover the fire exit door. We walked down the bottom floor of the theater, and I was joined there by Officer Walker by me, and as we walked up the north aisle from the center section, I observed Officer McDonald walking up the south aisle from the center section, and we observed two suspects sitting near the front in the center section.

Mr. BELIN. You were on the right center or the left center?

Mr. HUTSON. I was on the left center.

Mr. BELIN. That would be the left center,

Hutson testified at 9:00 pm on April 3, 1964. CT Walker testified on the same day at 1:30 pm. Both of these testimonies were taken by Belin. The timing of those testimonies is relevant. Belin asked Walker whether anyone drew a gun on entry. But Walker, despite claiming to have entered with Hutson, only referred to himself as having a gun. 

McDonald testified that he drove to the front of the theater and then walked to the rear of the theatre, where he met Hutson, Hawkins, and CT Walker. But McDonald too failed to mention the incident of the pulling of the gun. 

That indicates that only Hutson and Hawkins initially entered the theater, but CT Walker and McDonald for some reason pretended that they’d entered at the same time. 

WESTBROOK

Westbrook’s discrepancies were again legion. He said to the Warren Commission and in a report dated 3 December 1963 [https://texashistory.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metapth338798/] that he, Stringer, and FBI Agent Barrett (there was no Warren testimony for either of those two) went in a squad car with an unknown officer driving to the rear alley of the theater. Westbrook failed to mention Hutson and the gun incident with the shoe shop employee Brewer. Westbrook also said that there were two or three cars at the rear. But Hawkin’s 1:47 pm radio message said that there were five cars at the rear. 

Barrett, on November 23, 1963, filed an FBI report. [page 3: https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/opastorage/live/9/4607/7460709/content/arcmedia/dc-metro/rg-272/605417-key-persons/mcdonald_m_n/mcdonald_m_n.pdf] He refers to entering via the front and made no reference to Westbrook.

Ewell said that Westbrook drove him to the front of the theater with Stringer in an unmarked car.

However, Sgt. Stringer, on 3 December 1963, said that he was questioning a boy in the 100 block of S Patton with an officer when the alert at the Texas Theater came through. And that officers Hawkins and Baggett drove him to the alley at the rear of the theater. [https://texashistory.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metapth337160/m1/1/]

Stringer lied. Firstly, he was not at South Patton the minute before the Texas Theater call came through. He was on Crawford Street putting out the message on the radio regarding the examination of the jacket. Second, he did not arrive with Bagget and Hawkins; Hutson did. Third, he made no mention of Hutson pulling the gun on the person who opened the theater rear door.

By that, Westbrook and Stringer were both lying about the method of arrival and the point of entry. No one else supports either of their accounts other than Hawkins. Who, by the time of his Warren Commission testimony, had changed his December story to add Westbrook.

“Mr. BALL. Where did you park?

Mr. HAWKINS. I parked my squad car in the alley at the rear of the theater.

Mr. BALL. Then, what did you do? 

Mr. HAWKINS. Officer-I believe Officer McDonald was at the back door at the time, and Officer Hutson and Captain Westbrook and Officer Walker and myself went in the rear door. All went to the rear door, and at this time we saw a white male there and began talking to him and he identified himself as being the manager of a shoe store next door and that he was the person who had noted the suspicious acting on the suspect, and he at that time was brought into the rear of the theater and on the stage.” 

To summarize: Hawkins had put out a strange call for Westbrook and then made a land-line call from the Mobil garage at 10^th and Beckley at 1:30 pm. Hawkins’ car was the closest to the theater at the time of the 1:45 pm call, already heading towards it. CT Walker and McDonald were in the theater very soon after (or possibly before, via the front). Westbrook was pretending he had entered the back of the theater, avoiding the fact he’d driven and parked at the front. All of those irregularities indicate that there was more going on than merely the arrest of Oswald. 

A HYPOTHESIS

It might be that certain officers - all of whom later lied on one matter or other - did not need to rely on the message on patrol radio that a person had entered the Texas Theater if they already knew what was to happen next.

Those officers were Westbrook, McDonald, Hill, CT Walker, and Hawkins. Four of whom had issued false alarms, and one had made a landline call from the Mobil gas station.

That then takes us back to the proposition that there were two persons of interest in the Texas Theater. Oswald, who--according to employee Butch Burroughs--had been there from just after 1 pm on the first floor; and the decoy, who entered at about 1:40 pm and went to the balcony. With that, Oswald was taken out of the front, the other out the back. 

Is there further evidence for this hypothesis? Yes. The choreography of officer movements and the layout of the theater are relevant.

THE BALCONY, DOWNSTAIRS, THE FRONT AND THE BACK

The first radio reports had the suspect being in the balcony of the Texas Theater. Butch Burroughs said Oswald was in the theater from just after 1:00 pm. Bernard Haire said an Oswald lookalike was taken out of the back. Officer Stringfellow filed a report saying Oswald was arrested in the balcony.

The balcony of the Texas Theater was accessed from stairs at the front of the Jefferson Street foyer, or by an external fire exit in the alley at the rear. The main floor of the theater was accessed either from the main doors at the back of the foyer or ground level fire exits opening to the alley at the rear. It was also possible to get from the outside front to the outside back, and vice versa, via an outside tunnel alley. 

It is not disputed that Oswald was arrested on the first floor and left via the front. But if the fugitive was in the balcony and taken out via the back, the question is who went up there to deal with that and who assisted with that person being taken out the back.

Hill admitted he went in via the front and up to the balcony. Westbrook seems to have covered up that he, too, entered via the front. McDonald seems to have parked at the front, and then either gone in via the front entrance, or used the rear entrance via the tunnel alley. 

Hutson’s testimony reveals an odd command from Westbrook:

Mr. HUTSON. The gun was taken from the suspect's hand by Officer McDonald and somebody else. I couldn't say exactly. They were all in on the struggle, and Officer Hawkins, in other words, he simultaneously, we decided to handcuff him. We had restrained him after the pistol was taken, but he was still resisting arrest, and we stood him up and I let go of his neck at this time and took hold of his right arm and attempted to bring it back behind him, and Officer Hawkins and Walker and myself attempted to handcuff him. At this time, Sgt. Jerry Hill came up and assisted as we were handcuffing. Then Captain Westbrook came in and gave the order to get him out of here as fast as you can and don’t let anybody see him, and he was rushed out of the theater. I was in the row of seats behind. I saw Officer Walker and Sgt. Jerry Hill had hold of him, and that is the last I ever saw him. 

As emphasized: Why would Westbrook say, “don’t let anybody see him”? That order was not obeyed for Oswald. Oswald was seen and filmed leaving the front of the theater. Did Hutson overhear Westbrook referring to a second person who would be taken out the back?

But before dealing with that, another question arises. Why did the Theater staff not inform the audience and shut for the day once it was apparent the President had been shot and was dead? Wouldn’t such an outcome be a risk to any plan to make the theater the place for Oswald’s arrest?

The testimony of Julie Postal, the ticket seller, has points of interest regarding that theory:

Mrs. POSTAL. No, sir; I was looking up, as I say, when the cars passed, as you know, they make a tremendous noise, and he ducked in as my boss went that way to get in his car.

Mr. BALL. Who is your boss?

Mrs. POSTAL. Mr. John A. Callahan.

Mr. BALL. Where did you say he was?

Mrs. POSTAL. Yes; I say, they bypassed each other, actually, the man ducked in this way, and my employer went thataway, to get in his car.

By that, Callahan, who managed the theater, not only didn’t shut the theater, but got in his car after Postal purportedly saw someone “duck in”.  Elsewhere, she had denied seeing someone duck in herself, but here she said he passed Callahan. That oddity can’t be dismissed as just her observation. Detective LT Cunningham said:

We were questioning a young man who was sitting on the stairs in the balcony when the manager told us the suspect was on the first floor. (Report to Chief J. E. Curry 12/03/63)

Detective John B. Toney said: There was a young man sitting near the top of the stairs, and we ascertained from manager on duty that this subject had been in the theater since about 12:05 PM. (Report to Chief J. E. Curry 12/03/63)

However, Julia Postal testified that the Theater opened at 12:45 pm. The “manager” can’t have been Butch Burroughs, he wasn’t the manager, and he said he saw no one that early. (Jim Marrs, Crossfire, pp. 353-54) 

Greg Parker has published some background to the ownership of the Texas Theater [https://gregrparker.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/Texas-Theatre-mysteries-5-1.pdf?595453&595453] which links Callahan and the theater ownership to right-wing interests. Why would Callahan absent himself from the scene of a major event, which had caused his staff to call the police, at precisely the point it was heating up?

LAURA KITTRELL

Laura Kittrell was a Texas Employee Commission employee who had interviewed Oswald in connection with his seeking work in October 1962 and again in October 1963.

She gave a dossier of evidence to the HSCA, “the Kittrell manuscript”. The handwritten notes at the beginning are transcribed in type towards the end [https://digitalcollections-baylor.quartexcollections.com/Documents/Detail/sightings-of-lho-oct.-1963/687524?item=687528].

Kittrell’s father, William Henderson Kittrell, had been secretary of the Democratic Executive Committee of Texas, and she took 22 November 1963 off work to attend the Kennedy lunch at the Trade Mart. She said when she returned to her office the following week, her files had been taken by the FBI. She said that all the records relating to her interviews with Oswald in October 1963 were omitted from the Warren Commission report.

Kittrell thereafter took an interest in the assassination and interviewed Tom Bowden, the former caretaker of the Texas Theater, in 1976. He told her something remarkable: that on the morning of the assassination, police officers searched the theater. (See page 166 of the dossier). 

The dossier also shows how Kittrell’s interest was active well before the Warren Commission had reported. 

A Department of Justice Attorney, Barefoot Sanders, sent information from Kittrell to Warren Commission Counsels Jenner and Liebeler on April 9, 1964, stating, “I enclose a message of some length which I had the Secret Service pick up from Miss Laura Kittrell. Since this seems to concern an area of inquiry of the Commission in which you two are interested, I am forwarding it to you for your consideration and perusal” (page 5 of the dossier).

The dossier shows she wrote to J Edgar Hoover, and that on December  26, 1963, she wrote to Senator Robert Kennedy. She wrote to Robert Kennedy again on June 4, 1965, in frustration that she had not been called to testify for the Warren Commission. Her letter to Kennedy was sent from his office to Hoover, who wrote to Kennedy on August 27, 1965, stating, “there is some question as to her emotional stability”. 

Hoover’s response also casts doubt as to whether she had contact with the Secret Service. But the letter from Barefoot Sanders confirms that she had. 

The attachment Sanders sent is missing from the dossier. The letter from Hoover downplays her father’s political connections. But page 156 of the dossier shows Earl Golz of the Dallas Morning News stating that the father was prominent and had been acquainted with Roosevelt, Truman, and John F Kennedy. The effect of Hoover’s inaccurate letter to Robert Kennedy was to cast doubt on Kittrell and throw him off the scent. The Warren Commission files do not have a file for Kittrell. Kittrell said that the first person she met in October 1962 was Oswald but that the second person she met in October 1963 didn’t have the same bearing (page 166 of the dossier). 

She said that Oswald himself on  October 4, 1962 “looked very military as neat as a pin” and was “trim, energetic, compact and well-knitted” but the second person she saw on 22 October 1963 behaved badly and said he was “a trifling, shirtless, good-for-nothing lout who sprawled oafishly over his chair”. She was trained in asking questions to identify potential Social Security fraud.

As Kittrell’s interest can be pinned with certainty as early as December 1963, then her statements and interest cannot be put down to ‘conspiracy theories’ that grew as a result of the Warren Commission report. The report wasn’t published until September 1964. 

Kittrell said that the first Oswald in 1962 was the person all now know as Oswald. She said he had taken an aptitude test twice and on the verbal reasoning part of that test scored 126 and 127. She said that was the level expected from a college graduate, as the normal range was 100-120.

Kittrell also noted that Oswald’s second child was born on 20^th October 1963. She stated that it was quite strange for him to be at the Employment Commission on 22^nd October 1963, given that plus the fact he already had a job at the Depository. She, therefore, suspected fraud of some kind. 

BURT GRIFFIN AND CRAFARD

That all indicates that at some time before 9 April 1964, Kittrell had independently reached the same conclusion as some Commission staff. What was it?

A memo from Burt Griffin to staff, March 13, 1964, stated that Laverne “Larry Crafard” was one of four persons who they suspected might be impersonating Oswald. [https://www.kennedysandking.com/john-f-kennedy-articles/the-tippit-tapes-a-re-examination]

The dossier contains an FBI document dated  August 17, 1965 (page 37 of the dossier), which summarizes the issues. That document states that Kittrell later saw a photograph of Crafard in the Warren Commission papers, and she said he was the person she had interviewed as “Oswald” in October 1963.  It was Counsel Jenner who had asked Ruth Paine on March 20, 1964 (Vol III  p 94) whether Oswald resembled Crafard, and she said he did. 

Further, the Commission Staff note of March 10, 1964, had specifically asked for questioning regarding any discrepancies in the appearance and habits of Oswald at 1026 N Beckley and at Mary Bledsoe’s house (see my earlier article)

[https://www.kennedysandking.com/john-f-kennedy-articles/mary-bledsoe-and-the-bus-part-2]

Especially relevant is the Commission staff giving attention to Crafard being a possible decoy for the set-up of Oswald. But not calling Kittrell to the stand. The dossier shows that Kittrell was asked by the person she interviewed in October 1963 if she had visited the State Fair. She said no. Crafard told the FBI that he came to Dallas with the State Fair on 15 October 1963 and was a roustabout for a side show. (Crafard Exhibit 5226, Warren Commission, [https://history-matters.com/archive/jfk/wc/wcvols/wh19/pdf/WH19_Crafard_Ex_5226.pdf] ). If it was Crafard, did he ask that question to ensure she would not remember seeing him in that role?

If what Kittrell said is true, then she would indicate two things.

Firstly, Crafard--as the Commission suspected--was impersonating Oswald in Dallas in November 1963. 

Secondly, on the morning of 22 November 1963, the manager of the Texas Theater was in some way made aware of the police using his building for some purpose later in the day.

Overall, Kittrell’s actions and attention would make redundant any plan to involve her in painting a story of an unstable Oswald.  She would be a woman who not only wasn’t duped but was dangerous.

PUTTNG IT ALL TOGETHER

The evidence I have set strongly suggests a group of police officers involved in the planned assassination of Kennedy involving:

• getaway operations, as set out in earlier articles,
• safe movement of Oswald in a Rambler to the Texas Theater (likely assisted by Officer Nelson),
• staking out the Texas Theater (Mentzel),
• evidence planting at the depository (led by Hill).

That was supplemented by a decoy operation which involved the Marsalis bus. Otherwise, why single it out? That element of the operation was supposed to involve Tippit who, as with the other patrol officers, was under the command of Sgt. Hugh Davis. 

A plan to have Oswald portrayed as a decoy lone assassin - who would be eliminated at the Texas Theater having been duped - would require another decoy. Oswald would carry the risk of absconding if he made his own way to the Texas Theater, if he figured what was really happening. But securing Oswald’s passage by chaperoning him goes against a lone nut narrative. That is why a second decoy would be needed to give the appearance that Oswald had made his own way to the Theater, via 1026 N Beckley, walking and on public transport. 

The purpose of visiting 1026 N Beckley would be to explain how ‘Oswald’ had managed to acquire a jacket (having left the Depository without one) as well as a pistol. 

I posit that the Texas Theater operation was supposed to involve Tippit, Mentzel and McDonald, (all under the command of Sgt. Davis), CT Walker and Hawkins (both traffic division). Walker, like Mentzel, was in the area of Oak Cliff at the time of the assassination of Kennedy, near E Jefferson and E10th. Captain Westbrook had the seniority to be the center of co-ordinated corruption of the DPD for that plan. 

The successful operation in Dallas may have been a back-up “off the shelf” operation for the prior unexecuted plans to assassinate Kennedy in Chicago on November 2, 1963, and in Tampa on November 18, 1963. The other two may also have been dress rehearsals for the successful attempt in Dallas.

Per Exhibit 5002, Hill was not formally allocated to Westbrook’s bureau for November. But Hill was working out of Westbrook’s office. Was Hill’s role one of shifting the allocation of officers and leaning on officers to participate?

If Tippit had turned mid-operation, then he would have become a liability to everyone else involved. From 12:30 pm, everyone with any involvement would be guilty of conspiracy to assassinate the President. It would follow that Westbrook would have to go along with and organise an operation to improvise and associate the decoy with the ambush of Tippit. Hutson not going along with that is more evidence that he was not a confederate. Was his chance presence in Hawkins’ car - due to his burned-out clutch – and thence his presence for the arrest of Oswald a factor in Oswald not being killed in the Texas Theater? 

Indeed, was the absence of Tippit also a problem? If his role was protecting the decoy on the way to the theater, then it would follow that he would be the right person to deal with the decoy at the theater. According to work done by Bill Drennas, Tippit himself was seen at Top Ten Records on the morning of the assassinations. [https://www.jfk-assassination.net/top10.htm]

If Oswald had been killed at the Theater, then there would have been no TV coverage of him saying he was a “patsy”. There would have been no identity parades. Jack Ruby would not have needed to kill him. Jack Ruby’s role would have been invisible. So would Larry Crafard’s presence in Dallas. 

What is certain is that Hutson’s presence in Hawkins’ car has enabled us to observe that Hawkins was lying. Just as Owens’ evidence shows that Croy, Hill, and Westbrook were lying, too.

WHERE WAS DAVIS?

In addition to that, there is a missing officer to consider, Sgt. Hugh Davis. CE 2645 says: 

“On May 27, 1964. HUGH F. DAVIS, Sergeant, Dallas, Texas, Police Department, advised that on November 22, 1963, he was the supervising sergeant assigned to Districts 80 and 90, of Platoon 2, which was working the 7:00 am to 3:00 pm. shift that month. Sergeant DAVIS advised he recalled at the time of the assassination call he was driving Unit Number 179, an unmarked car, and was dispatched thereafter to the Texas School Book Depository at Elm and Houston Streets, where he remained until 3:45 P.M. that afternoon. Sergeant DAVIS advised that the course of his travels took him nowhere near 1026 North Beckley in the Oak Cliff section of Dallas, Texas, on November 22, 1963.”

The reference to Districts 80 and 90 omitted that Davis had - by the testimony of Owens - taken over control of Tippit (District 78). There is a further discrepancy concerning the command and supervision of southwest Dallas that day. That is apparent from a study of the patrol district numbers and call sign system.

Southwest Dallas comprised patrol districts 71-99, Downtown 101-119, Northwest 21-39, and Northeast 41-69. Call signs that ended in zero, being 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, 90, 100, 110, were for supervisory use for the next 9 numbers. So, call sign 70 would be the supervisor for 71-79 districts, etc. There were no districts 00 to 09 or 11 to 19. Those were used for senior officers higher up the chain of command. Because Owens replaced southwest Dallas Lieutenant Fulgham, Owens was allocated call sign 19. 

Call sign 70 was allocated to Sgt Samuel E Varner, reported in CE 5002 as in “Special Enforcement Detail”. 80 was allocated to Sgt Hugh Davis. 90 wasn’t allocated that day as Davis was in overt control of 81-89 and 91-99. 

Therefore, by that system, Sgt. Varner (70) was in supervisory charge of districts 71-79, hence Tippit (78). Sgt. Owens (19) was in commanding charge of Varner and Davis.

Looking back to what Owens said to the FBI on 20 May 1963. [https://www.kennedysandking.com/john-f-kennedy-articles/the-tippit-tapes-a-re-examination]

“Sergeant OWENS advised he could not furnish any information as to when or how TIPPIT's assignment from District 78 had been changed as he, OWENS, had gone to lunch and had not returned during the time that TIPPIT's assignment had been changed.”

Owens then stated that Tippit’s command (78) changed to the same command as Angell (81). That was the command of Davis. 

Varner makes no impact on the patrol radio tapes. Varner also has no mention in CE2645. By what Owens said and the absence of Varner in any patrol radio traffic, it seems Davis took supervisory control over all of southwest Dallas, 70s, 80s, and 90s. On the basis that Davis was in charge of so many officers, one would expect a radio presence from him. 

Davis (80) said “Clear” at 12:38 pm. There is then a call to 80 (Davis) at 12:42 pm, 80 says “80 Code 5,” which is en route. That call is missing from all transcripts, including the independent Shearer/Kimball transcript. That call was 30 seconds before Angell announced he was “still Lansing and 8^th”. There is then no message from Davis for the rest of the day. 

The next mention of Davis is from Owens at 1:42 pm, who asked, “is 80 in service?”. Despatch then called “80”, Owens then said “think he was called to Elm and Central. We need somebody to notify the officer’s wife”. There are then no more calls to, from, or about Davis. 

Hence, Davis was invisible from 12:42 pm (by what remains on the tapes). That is extraordinary given what was going on in Southwest Dallas and given he had supervisory control of all officers there, including the one who was shot. 

The matter of contacting a dead officer’s wife isn’t trivial. So why would someone supervising an out-of-the-ordinary number of patrol officers be incommunicado at the Depository? Was Davis, being the covert commander of Tippit, the person Tippit wished to meet face to face after he left Gloco, heading down Lancaster at speed?  Was this who Mentzel was communicating with?

If Westbrook and Hill set up the decoy element of the ambush of Tippit, then someone would have likely been setting up the killing itself. Witnesses at the murder scene said that Tippit behaved as if he knew the person who shot him. Could it have been someone on the force like policeman Harry Olsen? (McBride, p.584 ) The drive from Olsen’s house-guarding location near Lansing and 8^th to the murder scene was just 500 yards via the Lansing alley.

The positions of Lewis (35) and Parker (56) also require similar analysis to the above. There was no supervisor with call sign 50, which is who Parker should have been accountable to. Sgt. Putnam (60), as a possible substitute for 50 was allocated to other duties.

Bearing in mind that Parker was supposed to be 20 miles away in Garland, northeast Dallas, it is odd that immediately after the radio blackout at 12:30 pm, the Dispatcher asked at 12:33 pm, “Anyone know where 56 is?” That is not an obvious priority question given that the President had just been shot in Downtown Dallas. Making matters worse, when Parker did reply at 12:44 pm, he said he was at “East Jefferson”. Far out of the district and in Southwest Dallas.

Childon (30) would have been in supervisory control of Lewis, but he had no presence on the radio. That could be explained by the fact that the 31-39 patrol districts contained both the Trade Mart (the intended location for Kennedy’s luncheon speech) and Love Field Airport. The patrolling of Northwest and Downtown Dallas was understandably distracted by the visit of Kennedy. Southwest Dallas was not..

I have previously concluded that the Dispatcher Murray Jackson cannot have made the 12:45 pm radio call to Tippit and Nelson. This order sent Tippit to an area in Oak Cliff that was far away from where he was supposed to be.  It also sent patrolman Roger Nelson there, but he never arrived.  The order was not on the first transcript sent to the Warren Commission, which left the question: what was TIppit doing so far out of his area? I also conclude that there were so many irregularities regarding out-of-position officers and silent officers that Jackson could not have been unaware of them all.

Why did Jackson not question why there were so many discrepancies occurring in the 71-99 patrol districts of southwest Dallas? That being the part of Dallas with no exposure to any part of the planned Kennedy visit and motorcade. Those were discrepancies which occurred before the assassination of Kennedy, and then before, as well as after, the assassination of Tippit. 

Warren Commission apologists tend to take all police officer evidence as fact and then discredit the inconvenient evidence of those ordinary members of the public who contradicted the Warren Commission line. 

But any version of events that doesn’t take account of Tippit’s changed command, his actual locations, the lies of particular police officers, as well as tampered tapes will never get close to the truth. 

Click here to read part 1.