Death to Justice
By Paul Abbott
Paul Abbott’s Death to Justice is, as far as I know, a unique volume. There had never been an entire book devoted largely to the shooting of Lee Oswald by Jack Ruby. This is the first one.
When I say ‘largely’, the first three chapters deal with what I would call background to the main subject of the book. This would include things like the oddities around the shooting of Patrol Officer J. D. Tippit, which led to the apprehension of Oswald at the Texas Theater. (pp. 8-9) Oswald’s stay in the USSR and the newly discovered presence of a five-volume KGB set about that visit; the U2 spy plane episode and the case of Robert Webster. (pp. 17-19).
When the book gets to the actual assassination of President Kennedy, Abbott deals in broad outline with some of the more controversial aspects of that incident. For instance, Roger Craig and his testimony about Oswald escaping the Dealey Plaza area in a Nash Rambler, and the back-up witnesses for that incident; the Prayer Man issue about an image of Oswald at the top of the front steps of the Texas School Book Depository; the Butch Burroughs episode with him saying Oswald was at the Texas Theater before the time frame when the Warren Commission placed him there; and witness Bernard Haire saying he thought Oswald was taken out of the movie house by the back door. (pp. 32-40)
In a brief outline form, Abbott then deals with four of the official Washington inquiries into the JFK case. (Technically, the Assassination Records Review Board was not really an inquiry into the JFK case.) The first was the Rockefeller Commission, which he justifiably dismisses since it was appointed by President Gerald Ford and supervised by former Warren Commission counsel David Belin. (pp. 41-42). He then shifts to the senatorial Church Committee, its focus on assassination attempts against foreign leaders, and the Richard Schweiker/Gary Hart subcommittee’s critique of the performance of the FBI in service to the Warren Commission. The Church Committee was followed by the House Select Committee on Assassinations. (HSCA). Abbott justly characterizes that as being reduced to the status of a “toothless tiger”, due to political infighting and sabotage. (p. 43). To give the HSCA some credit, Abbott writes that, in comparison to the Commission, they did “a more critical and insightful overview of Lee Oswald’s shooting” (ibid). But in his view, it was still incomplete. Hence, the genesis of his book.
II
The author then concisely goes over the serious shortcomings of Oswald’s short stay in the hands of the Dallas Police. First, the fact that, for whatever reason, Oswald never had an attorney to represent him. That he was paraded in some unfair line-ups. Second, there was no evidence that any of his interrogations were either taped or made into stenographic form. And to this day, there is a debate on whether or not he was properly charged in the JFK case. (pp. 45-47). In fact, when Oswald was asked about this, he said he was not charged. (p. 80)
Methodically, the author describes what the scene was like in the Dallas City Hall basement. He lists the fact that there were at least six cameras on hand at various times during the approximate 48-hour time span Oswald was being held. (p.54). When Oswald was shot, Captain Will Fritz almost immediately proclaimed that the case was now closed since Oswald was the killer. (p. 61) Abbott notes the irony of this statement since, as anyone can see, it was Fritz’s negligence that allowed Oswald to be killed. In the films of the shooting that are not cropped, the viewer can see that Fritz broke from his position—which was supposed to be in front of Oswald—by at least five feet. It was this empty space that allowed Jack Ruby to step forward and shoot Oswald in the abdominal area. That single shot hit about every major organ it could have: the spleen, kidney, liver, aorta and vena cava. (p. 54). Oswald was pronounced dead at Parkland Hospital on Sunday at 1:07 pm, about 90 minutes after his arrival.
The Dallas Police did an investigation after the shooting. Predictably, they concluded that murderer Jack Ruby came down the Main Street ramp. And that there was no collusion with anyone, either on the police force or in the press. His entry was allowed due to what they termed “unfortunate circumstances”, and these resulted with a “momentary breakdown” of security. (p. 62)
Abbott concludes that this inquiry was sorely incomplete and the listing of witnesses on the scene during the murder ”neglects to account for others who were confirmed by the DPD as being there at the time of the shooting.” (p. 63) He points out that of the 70 police personnel that were interviewed, 22 were not in the basement at the time. Neither were 12 of the 21 reserve officers interviewed. (p. 64). One of the reserves was Kenneth Croy, who has already attracted attention from me and others in the murder of Tippit.
There was a search of the basement done before Oswald was brought down, and unauthorized personnel, like maintenance workers, were cleared away. Guards were placed at all entrances. They were told that only police and credentialed media were to be let in. (p. 67) The original plan was for Oswald to be transported to the county jail by armored car. This plan was changed shortly before Oswald was brought down. The transfer was going to be done by unmarked police cars. But this was done late. So both armored cars were on the scene anyway, one for the transport and one in reserve: one was in the entryway at Commerce Street, and one was parked down the street. The protection pocket for Oswald was arranged with two men on either side of the prisoner, then one behind and Fritz in front. As we have seen, that formation was broken when Fritz broke out too far in front of Oswald. Thus leaving a clear opening for Jack Ruby to dart out of the crowd and mortally wound him.
In their reporting, the police verified that Ruby sent a money order to one of his employees, Karen Carlin, that morning. This was done via Western Union, which was in direct proximity to the City Hall building.
They measured the distance from Western Union to the top of the Main Street ramp and proceeding into the basement. They concluded it would take a minute and thirty-five seconds to walk, which was more than enough time for Ruby to leave that office and position himself in the crowd for the shooting.
That above conclusion was adduced as factual—even the points that, as we shall see, were quite problematic, e.g., Ruby coming down the Main Street ramp. The police had to do this, of course, because— in probably the most shocking scene ever broadcast— the murder took place on live TV.
One of the main problems that is implicit in that police report, and also in watching films of the shooting, is that the DPD allowed far too many media people to be in the direct area of the transfer. And not only were there too many people, there was too much equipment. This included distracting lights, which likely made it harder to detect Ruby as he rushed out to fire. (p. 68). Why the police allowed all these press people to be so close is a recurring question the author brings up throughout the book. (See, for example, p. 76, where the police themselves misrepresented where the press was at the crucial time.)
III
When the Warren Commission examined the murder of Oswald, it spent only 35 of its nearly 900 pages on that case. And since the Commission was so reliant on the FBI, that is where much of its info came from. They also concluded that Ruby had slipped into the basement unaided. (p. 72) The most relevant criticism made by the Commission was that the transfer should have been done the night before, and Chief Curry should not have announced the time in public.
The author points out that witness Jimmie Turner had his testimony distorted by the Commission. They said that Turner was confident that he saw Ruby coming down the Main Street ramp. This was not what the man said. He said he saw him at the bottom of the ramp, and he had never seen Ruby before. And this also differs from Turner’s original statement to the police. With them, he said he did not see Ruby until just before the first shot was fired, and he did not recall seeing him in the basement. This is how desperate the FBI and the Commission were to find a witness to their preordained scenario. Their problem was that no one saw Ruby coming down the Main Street ramp. (pp. 74-77)
Because of his questioning of Oswald, Fritz was behind schedule as to when the transfer would be effected. (pp. 80-81) Sheriff Decker did not even know how it would happen, but that office had received death threats over the phone. The FBI had gotten at least one and relayed it to the police.
After reviewing the overall security setup, Abbott concludes that not every point of entry was covered. (Pp. 91-93, p. 100). There was also a mysterious man in the locker room just before the shooting, and he was not identified by the two witnesses who saw him. The Commission never found out who he was either.
Tom Howard’s law firm was located across the street from City Hall. He was on the scene, as he told the FBI, since he had received a call from someone at the jail on behalf of another party. (p. 102). He managed to get in through Harwood Street. He heard a shot but did not see Oswald or Ruby. He turned around and walked back the same way he came and onto Harwood Street. This all begs the question: How secure was the building? Because Howard was not a cop or a press person.
As per the sheer number of press people, the author shows that the DPD simply left out 24 of them from their schematic drawing of the scene. (p. 128). Then, at all levels of the inquiry, there were three of them who were relied upon: Ike Pappas, Jerry O’Leary and Maurice Carroll. As the author is at pains to show, these men were not reliable as to where they were right before the shooting. (pgs. 116-17)
The two men who were to arrange for security in the basement were Sgts. James Putnam and Patrick Dean. But even during the search that morning, the media was not ordered to depart the scene. And, in fact, the author thinks this was done on purpose for publicity reasons. (pp. 153-55). Dean then assigned officers to locations at Elm, Commerce and Main. He also assigned officers for the convoy to Decker’s office. Detectives were called in at 11 AM to form an escort for Oswald. At this point, the author reveals that at the time of Oswald’s entry into the foyer, there were as many press representatives on hand as there were police officers, 46-46. How this was allowed to happen is bewildering. Because the larger the crowd, the easier it was for an unauthorized person to hide himself.
Then, about 10-15 minutes before Oswald appeared in the basement, two men were moved from their guard assignments: Gano Worley and Alvis Brock. (p. 171) Their positions were on the eastern side of the basement car park. Brock was switched at about 10:45 AM to Elm and Ervay. Worley was moved about 15-20 minutes later. (pp. 171-73) He was also moved outside, to Commerce and Central Expressway. As the author notes, this was odd since there was already someone at that location. Worley said it was Ben McCoy who told him to move. McCoy said he got that instruction from Dean. Worley said there was a man called in to replace the pair, but as the author notes, this is problematic. Since the man who was the likely replacement, William J. Newman, never mentioned it. (p. 174) As the author notes, it was this entrance that was adjacent to where the Oswald transfer was to take place.
IV
Officer Roy Vaughn was posted at the Main Street ramp at 9:30 AM. He recalled every person he allowed to pass, and he followed his instructions on that matter. He was joined by a former member of the force, Napoleon Daniels. As the author notes, his testimony to the DPD, FBI and Warren Commission is of questionable value. Like some other important people, namely Patrick Dean, he failed his polygraph. (p. 177, p. 182)
Across the street, leaning against his car, was Sgt. Don Flusche. He never saw Ruby approach the ramp or proceed down it. And he knew Ruby. He reported this to his supervisor, Lt. Earl Knox. He never heard back from him. (p. 178). He was not interviewed by either the Warren Commission or the FBI.
When Oswald was escorted out, many of the police were looking back at him. They should have been looking forward, clearing a path— and also keeping the reporters, like Tom Pettit, from getting too close. Although there were accusations of people screaming out at the time, for example, calling Ruby an SOB, the author says none of these were recorded on any audio he could find. (p. 193)
If one watches the prelude to the murder in the film Evidence of Revision, one will see Ruby clearly hiding behind the football player sized Blackie Harrison before he darts out. This would be bad enough. But the author points out that Harrison said he tried to grab Ruby. But this is not backed up by the photo evidence. (p. 196). After Ruby shot Oswald, he seemed to try to lunge forward, but he was held back by detectives Jim Leavelle and L. C. Graves. The book then states something jarring that I had never noticed before. Abbott writes that Detective Miller then placed a dark garment over Ruby’s head, apparently to hide his face. He adds that it happened so quickly and surely that it is almost like he was prepared to do so. But still, no questions were asked as to why. (p. 205)
Oswald was not whisked off to the hospital. He was taken back to the jail office. The first man to tend to Oswald was the first aid specialist for the police. And it took him a few minutes to get to the mortally wounded prisoner. In his first interview, Fred Bieberdorf said that when he arrived, he thought Oswald was dead. He then did what was probably the worst thing he could have done: he began to massage the sternum, this for a very critical abdominal wound. (pp. 208-09)
After almost five minutes, the ambulance arrived. And even at that, the driver had to wait for almost another minute for the armored car to clear the driveway. Dr. Charles Crenshaw has said that if Oswald would have been treated properly and quickly he could have survived. (p. 218)
V
In his denouement, Mr. Abbott points his finger at two main suspects: Dean and Harrison. It was Dean who said that, just after Ruby was handcuffed, Ruby declared he came in off the Main Street ramp. No one else recalled this at that time. (pp. 226-27) Abbott suspects that Dean made up this quote, and later, others recalled it out of necessity—for instance, in condemning Ruby to the death penalty at his trial. According to one journalist, Dean even told him he saw Ruby come down the ramp, which Abbott states was not possible. And which Dean later denied he said.
After talking to Tom Howard, his first attorney, Jack Ruby came up with his motive for murder: grief over Kennedy’s death and pity for his family. (pp. 231-32) He now declared he came down the ramp. To which Fritz said, No, you did not. Ruby then shut his mouth. Abbott argues that it was Howard who told him to say these things. And Abbott believes Ruby went along with it to cover up his real role in the conspiracy. The author bases this on the testimony of Julia Ann Mercer, which was well depicted by director Oliver Stone in his film JFK. He also uses the quote by Robert Vanderslice, who said that Ruby called him that morning and asked him if he ”would like to watch the fireworks.” He met Ruby in Dealey Plaza, and they were there at the time of the assassination. Ruby then left and headed towards the Dallas Morning News building without saying anything. (p. 239)
At about 1:30, based on the reliable testimony of journalist Seth Kantor, Ruby was at Parkland Hospital. Later that afternoon, Ruby began his daily visits to the police station. At about 6 PM, Ruby was seen trying to enter Fritz’s outer office door, where Oswald was being questioned. He was stopped by an officer who said, “You can’t go in there, Jack.” (p. 242) Ruby then showed up for DA Henry Wade’s infamous midnight press conference. Ruby later lied about this by saying this was the first time that day he was at the station.
Abbott does a neat job tracking Ruby’s weekend, and—as others have pointed out—it’s difficult not to conclude that Ruby was stalking Oswald. There is one matter I wish he would have delineated at more length. After studying the topic, it seems clear to me that it was Ruby who arranged to wire one of his dancers, Karen Carlin, a loan the next morning. Which put him at Western Union at the correct time he needed to be there. (p. 248)
Abbott spends several pages demonstrating how Ruby really got into the building that morning. It most definitely was not by marching down the Main Street ramp. We have the testimony of Don Flusche and Roy Vaughn, who said that he did not. They are much more trustworthy than Dean.
This is a creditable book that focuses on what was, in relative terms, a rather inadequately explored subject. Mr. Abbott has now made two contributions to the vast topic of the JFK murder: this book and his index to the files of Jim Garrison.
